THEOLOGICAL ESSAYS

A.V.C.P. HUIZINGA

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THEOLOGICAL ESSAYS

BY

A. V. C. P. HUIZINGA

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To Holland's Grand Old Man,
Dr. Abraham Kuyper,
Statesman, Theologian, Publicist,
These Essays Are Inscribed as a
Tribute by the Author

PREFACE

In giving these essays to the press the author is fully aware that too many theological treatises already claim attention. Besides, so many other subjects occupy the modern mind. Why then add to the large number of theological essays. Simply because these have a place in maintaining the orthodox standards, and of such there are none too many nowadays. Furthermore the author hopes that these essays may serve to spread the everlasting evangelical truth here as in his native land. In the Netherlands under the able leadership and life-long labors of Dr. Kuyper the evangelical standards of the Reformed faith are everywhere stoutly maintained. Here almost everywhere outside Princeton Theological Seminary the principles of the Reformation sadly need to be reaffirmed. American prosperity, the pragmatic attitude of life, and the utilitarian principles of the great republic are not conducive to the right appreciation of the Calvinistic faith.

Honor is therefore due to Princeton for keeping so faithfully under these untoward circumstances to the evangelical standards. May Princeton become more and more the rallying point of all who wish to preserve the faith as once delivered unto the saints. The Dutch-Americans and the Dutch from South Africa number at times a score of students in Princeton. May the Holland-Dutch also find more their way to Princeton into the United States, and may the Dutch-Americans turn increasingly towards the rich theological lore of the Netherlands and keep in close touch with the cultural and Christian treasures of their native land!

It will be of great benefit to all. It will be of great benefit every way. Old Holland might make even

greater contributions to the world than it yet has made. Where people nowadays are drifting with every wind of doctrine, not the least contribution would be the preservation and the spread of the old evangelical faith. The wide introduction here of the Dutch national anthem, that beautiful battle hymn of the Reformation, Wilhelmus van Nassauwe, alone would be a contribution of inestimable value. Where is the poet to render it into English?

Two of these essays have appeared in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* and one has been published separately before.

A. V. C. P. HUIZINGA.

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Theological Essays

THE HEDONISTIC AND THE CHRISTIAN PARADOX

I. Spirit of the Age

OUR age is professedly indulgent. The modern man dislikes intensely the harsh discipline of bygone days. Hence the present phase of self-indulgence in our social life calls insistently for the removal of all irksome restraints. All bonds must be broken. Now that man has found himself in these enlightened days he must be free from the trammels of the past. In fact, did ever restraints function beneficially either to the individual or to society? Is it not the very nature of restraint to keep down, to suppress, to dwarf or distort our natural endowments? Thus the modernist aims in matters of religion at the removal of intellectual discipline which as dead dogma of the past naturally interferes with the spontaneous activity which characterizes the new religion.

Religion subjective. For the religion of the modernist is a *religion de moi,* strikingly individualistic, ancillary to aesthetic sentiment and poetic rapture. The modern *Weltanschauung* enhances the sum-total of life's yields, the religious view compensates in a materialistic atmosphere for the lack of the true spirit of science, poetry, and art in one's life; it colors the dull, prosaic reality bright with the ideals of unseen worlds. Thus religion becomes an aid to life, and may serve as a substitute for aesthetic and poetic appreciation of the world, as the pagan poet Goethe had it:

"Wer Wissenschaft hat und Kunst
Der hat auch Religion.
Und wer sie nicht hat,
Der habe Religion."

Individualism in Society. The modernist view in regard to society similarly aims at setting the individual free from the bonds which society imposes. The sanctions of the past that still would bind individual freedom are like superstitions, haunting the living present like the ghosts in Ibsen's play. Life must not be circumscribed by innumerable petty rules and regulations, each person should find within himself the true law of life. Thus each one becomes a rule to himself. Though individual morality is of necessity conditioned in its development and expression by the social *milieu* in which the individual moves, this is but the circumstance, the setting of life's play, and imposes no rules upon the player. Man struts a king upon this scene of modernity, and monarch of all he surveys, for individual claims come first. All authority is but human; man-made are the highest sanctions that bind to earth or heaven. All authority finds its origin, as well as its justification in man. Consequently man alone is sovereign in this world; and if in all things human, then also, and first of all, sovereign over himself!

Self-Realization. Hence arise the vaunted theories of self-realization, for man conjointly with his fellow creatures is the legislator and builder of his own destiny! Yet, in the conduct of life's career, the modernist finds still many difficulties in the way—and the greatest of them all is . . . himself. Precisely those persons who incline to drift farthest from man's evident purpose seem to proclaim loudest this motto of self-realization.

The Quest for a Rule of Life. When the advocates of self-realization face this main obstacle, man himself, they repair to a better rationale for the conduct of life. Man, the author of his own morality, must set order in his mode of living. For the modernist, who makes man the author of his own morality, does not perceive the difficulty that man-made morality can hardly rule man, for the simple reason that the alleged law cannot possibly be rendered obligatory upon its own author. He therefore lays the faults to the wrong way of conducting the art of living. The rule of life is not suitably chosen, or not consistently and rationally followed. Thus rules of right living come in order.

In a materialistic, pleasure-loving age the most acceptable rules for the conduct of life are those which meet the *Zeitgeist.* As our age dislikes forbidding, harsh discipline, and craves indulgence to the desires of the heart, it is but natural that the hedonistic theories to-day are revived under different names, as individualistic, autonomic, utilitarian, evolutionary and other brands of ethics. The pleasure loving age has its high-day, and formulates again its self-indulgent life-practices in various ways on every hand. Martensen observes: "This abstract autonomic morality only appears at those seasons when there is also religious decay." (*Christian Ethics,* p. 17).

II. Kant's Ethics Autonomic, But Wholly Unlike Modern Morality

If it should be urged that Kant proclaimed autonomy in ethics, and yet formulates a most rigoristic theory of ethics, it is well to remember that Kant's whole system is one safeguard against self-indulgent individualism. The stars above and the moral law within in-

spire him with ever-undiminished awe and wonder. Though he, indeed, declared that reason legislates within the soul by its own right, thus proclaiming autonomy in ethics, his imperative of the practical reason as final authority of duty is a *categorical* imperative. We remember what special pains he took to safeguard his imperative from individual influence and inclination, how he set the moral dictum artificially, seemingly almost arbitrarily, against one's personal likes, calling forth Schiller's well-known bantering epigram. Significant also is the circumstance that Kant failed to give the categorical imperative specific form. The normative principle of his ethics has no content. Thus Kant's categorical imperative remains an impersonal dictum, leaving the ethical law to be applied by the individual.

View of Religion. When then again Kant defines religion as "the taking of our duties as divine commands" (*"Religion ist die Auferfassung unserer Pflichte als göttliche Gebote"*), he stands by whole diameters removed from the modern autonomic moralist. Kant, in fine was profoundly influenced by Christianity. The early training by his pious mother and the subsequent teaching of dogmatics by Shultz may well account for the adoption of Christian elements which were impossible of assimilation in his system. Though Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* would not allow him to relate theoretically the moral law to its source, his practical reason has constant regard for God, as the ground of the moral law. Thus only can we account for the unconditional claim on man's obedience, thus only can Kant speak of an erring conscience as a chimera!

No Erring Conscience. Of course, an erring conscience is not a chimera, but a sadly constant fact of everyday experience. However, where-as in Kant's

system—the imperative is left an impersonal dictum, and conscience thus emptied of content except the formal distinction between right and wrong, the judgment may stand. Conscience thus defined, however, would not be confined within man, but refers necessarily back to God.

Emphasis on a Good Will. Moreover the fact that Kant strongly emphasizes a good will—"Nothing in this world or even outside it is to be considered absolutely good, except a good will"—possibly prevents him from being classed with modern autonomic ethics which take a strong individualistic turn. For thus he approaches the Christian aspiration for a recitude of will, and though his good will is not distinctly brought to its author, here too the petition of the Lord's prayer may be taught; "Thy will be done on earth as it is in Heaven!" Though Kant's ethics are autonomic, they are kept from all individualistic turns—apart from the above observed safeguarding against personal likes and dislikes—by their formal universality.

Ethical Law in Man, not wholly of Man. As the *Critique of Pure Reason* declares: *"Macht der Verstand zwar die Natur, aber er schafft sie nicht,"* so in Kant's ethical system, man, to be sure, makes the law, but he creates it not. There might properly be drawn a parallel between Kant's empty concepts and his formal ethical law. As concepts without percepts are blind, so Kant's ethical law without content remains bare and formal.

Quotation from Kant. Kant says in his *Critique of Practical Reason*: theorem 4, "Autonomy of will is the sole principle of all moral laws, and of the duties which are in conformity with them. Heteronomy of will, on the other hand, not only supplies no basis for obligation, but it is contradictory of the principle of

obligation and of the morality of the will. The single principle of morality thus consists in independence of all matter of the law, that is, of every object of desire, and in the determination of the will through the mere universal form of law, of which a maxim must be capable. This independence of all matter is freedom in the negative sense, just as self-legislation of pure practical reason is freedom in the positive sense."

Kant Confined to Phenomenal World. The quotation illustrates how Kant, captive to the conception of his noumenon (*Ding an sich*) was rigidly held within the limitation of phenomena. He admits in the *Critique of Judgment*: "The conception of an absolutely necessary being is an indispensable idea of reason, but it is an idea which remains for human intelligence a problem which it cannot solve." "It is at least possible,"—he goes on—"to regard the material world as a mere phenomenon, and to conceive of its substrate as a thing in itself to which an intellectual perception corresponds. Thus we get the idea of a suprasensible and real ground of the world of nature to which we ourselves belong, although that ground is not for us an object of knowledge." Similarly he observes: "There is no adequate reason for regarding external phenomena as such from a teleological point of view; the reason for it must be sought in the suprasensible substrata of phenomena. But as we are shut out from any possible view of that substratum, it is impossible for us to find in nature grounds for an explanation of nature." (Watson's translation). It is only too evident that for the great sage of Königsberg it was forever: *"Ein vergebliches Rütteln an den Gittern der Kerkerfenster seiner Erscheinungswelt,"* for as he maintained in the *Critique of Pure Reason* the wildest hypothesis is preferable to an appeal to the supernatural (Doctrine of Method).

III. A Theistic Basis Needed for Moral Conduct

Green's Theistic Basis of Ethics. In this connection it is worthy of notice that Thomas H. Green prefaces his *Prolegomena to Ethics* with an epistemological discussion to establish a basis for his ethics. The spiritual element in knowledge constitutes the metaphysical introduction to Green's prolegomena. Sidgwick is greatly mistaken in declaring that this theistic basis and metaphysical consideration bear no connection to Green's ethics. On the contrary, Green felt that one cannot justify "a theory of values in human conduct" without guaranteeing the values on which our life-actions are staked. For a serious discussion in this normative science, we must make sure of our determinant of values. Thus Green's ethics are founded on Hegelian theology where objective and subjective mind figure prominently in their interrelation and inter-action.

God the Source of Moral Law. No strictly rational ethics is possible. We cannot, even in theory, be good without God. The postulate involved in every ethics that the individual destiny at best coincides with the larger good, and conversely, assumes a theistic basis. It is impossible to explain the sentiment of *ought* from *what is*. The feeling of *ought* is an original, un-analyzable fact. The revelation of God at the heart of man is the original source of all religion, and also the source of all obligations and duties, of whatever specific content they may be.

This origin explains the commanding authority of the moral sentiment. Ethics discloses what is before us and behind us, the moral nature of what bears us and what leads us. What ought to be is felt to be the basis and ground as well as the goal of all that is. In the ethical sphere first and final causes merge into one,

thus in the ethical nature the heart of reality is laid bare. It is safe to predict that in our age of indifference towards philosophical discipline we may expect a reawakening of metaphysical studies through interest in ethical questions. Professor Eucken sounds a significant warning in his *"Hauptprobleme der Religions philosophic der Gegenwart"* when he says: "That the Metaphysical can be shown to be ethical, and the ethical to be metaphysical constitutes the characteristic nature and greatness as well as the constant tension of Christianity. Former times often have treated it one-sidedly as metaphics, let us beware to lower it to mere ethics." *"Dass das Metaphysische sich als ethisch und das Ethische sich als metaphysich erweist, das eben bildet die Eigentümliche Art unr Grösse und zugleich auch eine fortwährende Spannung des Christentums; frühere Zeiten haben es oft zu einseitig in Metaphysik verwandelt, hüten wir Neueren uns, es zu einer blossen Ethik sinken zu lassen," p.* 89). Only when ethics rests on the religious basis of theistic belief have the English words *duty* and *ought* meaning, in that they refer to One who is Creator and Judge, to whom is due, to whom is owed, to whom we pray that He "forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors." Thus it is that the very prologue of the Decalogue bases morality upon religion, while the last commandment addresses itself to the inner recesses of the heart requiring that the will of God be done from the heart. Paul affirms that unless the Law had said: "Thou shalt not covet," he would not have known what sin meant.

Von Hartmann Quoted. Even Edward von Hartmann admits freely: "All facts point to the circumstances that the ethical consciousness of man has developed exclusively on the basis of religious conviction, that ethics nowhere has arisen without this, and that

in its specific coloring it everywhere has been conditioned and determined by religion." (*"Das religiöse Bewusstsein der Menschheit"*). To conceive of the purpose for which we are created, "the chief end of man to glorify God and enjoy Him forever," affords an objective authoritative norm. The impossibility of its psychological explanation only corroborates the fact of its being a primordial rule inherent in the nature of God. The modern world, however, forms rules as a consequence of our own desires.

Höffding says: "As the concept of purpose depends on the concept of worth, so also the concept of norm depends on the concept of purpose. The norm is the rule for the activity which is necessary to attain the purpose" (*Problems of Philosophy*).

Modern Morality Means that Man is to be Happy. Kant, in spite of his disavowal of the supernatural as the source of ethical command, clearly differs with modern morality in his insistence that ethics is of inner personal worth, evaluated not on motive, but on self-perfection in rectitude of will. Modern morality leaves fixed standards, for desire is paramount. The new freedom plays fast and loose with binding rules. Modern morality computes its course according to the probable pleasure-yield of situations before the agent's eager eye. The source and standard of ethical behavior is neither in God, nor in man, but lies before us in what life may give of joy and happiness. Man's thinking is related organically to his conduct. Thus in the pleasure-pursuit with dreams of joy the modern man pictures happiness as the all-inclusive aim of life. Man is made for happiness! The "Man of Sorrows" has no place in this modern view of life. Life, becomes an avowed pursuit of pleasure, must itself be regarded as an object of pleasure.

Sonnet of Alfred de Musset. How strikingly, however, contrast with the words of the "Man of Sorrows": "I came that they might have life and have it abundantly," the frivolous morale of French infidelity as in Alfred de Musset's sonnet:

"Dieul'a voulu, nous cherchons le plaisir.
Tout vrai regard est un désir;
Mais le désir n'est rien si l'on n'espère;
Et d'espérer c'est une affaire.
C'est pourquoi nous devons aimer l'illusion.
Béni soit le premier qui sut trouver un nom
A la demi-folie
A ce rêve enchanté
Qui ne prend de la vérité
Que ce qu'il faut pour faire aimer la vie!"

Other Literary Verdicts. It would seem that illusion and disappointment lurk amidst the life-designs of gayety which frivolity cannot always evade or escape. In fact, it is a rather general verdict that states of happy consciousness are not easily contrived. Those who have most experience in pleasure seeking tell of disappointed effort.

Keats. Keats voices it in a fine description, where "la belle dame sans merci" enthralls those who chase the bubbles of life, when he concludes:

"Let the winged fancy roam.
Pleasure never is at home."

Carlyle. Carlyle exclaims in grim sarcasm: "But it is said our religion is gone. God's absolute laws, sanctioned by an eternal Heaven and an eternal Hell, have become moral philosophies, sanctioned by able

computations of Profit and Loss, by weak considerations of Pleasure of Virtue and the Moral Sublime. It is even so. To speak in the ancient dialect, we 'have forgotten God'—in the modern dialect and very truth of the matter, we have taken up the Fact of the Universe as it is not. The prophets preach to us, 'thou shalt be happy, thou shalt love pleasant things, and find them.' The people clamor, 'why have we not found pleasant things?' We construct our theory of Human Duties, not on any Greatest Nobleness principle, never so mistaken, no, but on a Greatest Happiness principle. The word *soul* with us, as in some Slavonic dialects, seems to be synonymous with *stomach*. The Greatest Happiness Principle fast seems to be becoming a rather unhappy one! What if we should cease babbling about happiness, and leave it resting on its own basis, as we used to do!"

Longfellow. Similarly Longfellow's *Psalm of Life* enjoins:

> "Not enjoyment and not sorrow
> Is our destined end or way
> But to act that each to-morrow
> Find us farther than to-day."

IV. Faust's Pact With Mephistopheles Illustrates "Man Cannot Live By Bread Alone"

The most classic instance of the disappointing pleasure pursuit in the world's literature is perhaps Faust's pact with Mephistopheles. It is worth while to give it here in this light at some length, because of its fine observation and its literary excellence.

Goethe makes it plain from the beginning that even the sceptic Faust doubts that Mephistopheles ever should satisfy him fully.

When Mephistopheles says:

"Ich will mich hier zu deinem Dienst verbinden,
Auf deinen Wink nicht rasten und nicht ruhn.
Wenn wir uns drüben wieder finden,
So sollst du mir das Gleiche tun."

Faust answers:

"Das Drüben kann mich wenig kümmern;
Schlägst du erst diese Welt in Trümmern,
Die andre mag darnach entstehn.
Aus dieser Erde quillen meine Freuden,
Und diese Sonne scheinet meinen Leiden;
Kann ich mich erst von ihnen scheiden
Dann mag, was will und kann geschehn.
Davon will ich nichts weiter hören,
Ob man auch künftig hasst und liebt,
Und ob es auch in jenen Sphären
Ein oben oder Unter giebt.

Mephistopheles observes, that with such sceptic sentiments about the future world it is easy for Faust to risk the bargain, and promises him unprecedented earthly joy.

"In diesem Sinne kannst du's wagen.
Verbinde dich; du sollst, in diesen Tagen,
Mit Freuden meine Künste sehn.
Ich gebe dir, was noch kein Mensch gesehn."

Thereupon Faust retorts with bitter sarcasm that these earthly joys are forever transitory, volatile and ephemeral.

"Was willst du armer Teufel geben?
Ward eines Menschen Geist, in seinem hohen Streben
Von deinesgleichen je gefasst?
Doch hast du Speise, die nicht sättigt, hast
Du rotes Gold, das ohne Rast,
Quecksilber gleich, dir in der Hand zerrinnt,
Ein Spiel, bei dem man nie gewinnt,
Ein Mädchen, das an meiner Brust
Mit Aügeln schon dem Nachbar sich verbindet,
Der Ehre schöne Götterlust,
Die, wie ein Meteor, verschwindet?
Zeig'neir die Frucht, die fault, eh'man sie bricht,
Und Bäume, die sich täglich neu begrünen!"

Faust, then, has no illusion that Mephistopheles ever should wholly satisfy him, but if Faust should find full satisfaction in what Mephistopheles offers, then he is also his willing slave.

"Und Schlag auf Schlag!
Werd'ich zum Augenblicke sagen:
Verweile doch! du bist so schön!
Dann magst du mich in Fesseln schlagen,
Dann will ich gern zu Grunde gehn."

How difficult a task Mephistopheles has to captivate Faust wholly becomes evident subsequently throughout the drama. As Schroer observes: *"Sein auf das Reale gerichtecer Sinn, der aber, bei liebevoller Betrachtung dem Realen das Ideale abgewinnt, eröffnet ihm (dem Faust) die Erkenntniss des Dauernden im Wechsel. Vergebens dass Mephistopheles ihm zum Gemeinen herabzuziehen bemüht ist, Faust's Blick ist fest auf das Dauernde gerichtet."* It is on account of this estimate of Faust, giving the priority of the ideal over the actual,

of the spiritual world over the world of earthly, sensuous things that the crux of the drama is rightly found in *"Die finstere Gallerie."*

Here the tide of Faust's struggles turns to victory for the ideal, because Faust of his own account, in spite of Mephistopheles, sets out resolutely in search for the ideal. Mephistopheles, whose horizon is limited to sensuous things, treats Faust's fancied quest as foolish. Helena, the German spirit, is to be wedded, starts off a gradual assent of Faust, giving him *"Uberlegenheit"* over Mephistopheles.

In the classic, romantic Walpurgusnight of the second part, it is important to realize fully that Faust in carrying the keys to search for Helena, holds indeed the key to his own salvation, and gains victory over Mephistopheles, his evil self. By means of these keys he is led to *"das Ewig-weibliche,"* to *"die Mütter."*

Mephistopheles has misgivings and objects:

> *"Ungern entdeck' ich, höheres Geheimniss*
> *Göttinnen thronen hehr in Einsamkeit,*
> *Um sie kein Ort, noch weniger eine Zeit;*
> *Von ihnen sprechen ist Verlegenheit,*
> *Die Mütter sind es!"*

Faust, however, is profoundly stirred by the mention of *"die Mütter."* Lœper tells us that Eckerman's inquiry after the meaning of *"die Mütter"* was met by Goethe in semi-sarcastic way, but indicated that he meant to give it all the significance of *"das Ewig-weibliche." "Die Mütter sind die Urbilder, Ideale alles Dasein, sie müssen Mephistopheles um so widerwärtiger Sein, da er ja die Ideale nicht vermag wahr zu nehmen."* In spite of Mephistopheles's arguments, Faust persists in his quest for the ideal, and replies to

the sneer of Mephistopheles of "Nothingness," *"Oed und Einsamkeit,"* simply: *"Nur immer zu! Wir wollen es ergründen, In deinem Nichts hoff'ich das All zu finden!"* And—*"das Ewig-weibliche zieht uns hinan"* —when Faust sinks down at the close of the drama and the evil spirits, the lemures, take him up, only to lay him down upon the ground, Mephistopheles in his impotence to prevail over Faust, sneers the spiteful comment:

"Ihn sättigt keine Lust, ihm gnügt kein Glück
So buhlt er fort nach wechselnden Gestalten
Den letzten, leeren Augenblick
Der Arme wünscht ihn fest zu halten."

V. Pragmatic Morality and the Mosaic Law

While thus in literature verdicts abound which proclaim the folly and futility of pleasure not only as the dominating pursuit in life, but even of pleasure as a pursuit in life, it is preached from the very housetops nowadays that life is to be exploited; its capacities are to yield us satisfaction, ease and joy. We are to have a good time while it lasts. Meanwhile it is high time that the ten commandments were held up again before the multitude. The Decalogue as a summary of man's duty to God and to his fellowman must resume its claims against the boundless, insatiable assumption of selfish desire which runs riot in the domain of modern morality. Not the assumptions of the intellect are the modern foe to the rules of faith and practice, it is the new mode of living, the dominating and domineering demands for pleasure, ease, and indulgence which set duties aside and would do away with pain. Even the pragmatist William James observed: "We have had

of late too much of the philosophy of tenderness in education. . . . Soft pedagogies have taken the place of the old steep and rocky path to learning. But from this lukewarm air the bracing oxygen of effort is left out. It is nonsense to suppose that every step in education can be interesting." James might have observed also that a man cannot be subject to the mere desire to please self, when he is fired with the desire to please God.

Pragmatism is a theory of success, and an accursed success if taken as the world generally views it. Yet Pragmatism leaves you with no rule except success which thereby renders the alleged rule as rule invalid. Thus Pragmatism emancipates of all objective law, it weakens the sense of duty, does away with inviolate rules, principles, conscience. Tartuffe may now proclaim aloud without contradiction: "True knowledge extends the limits of our conscience according to our needs." (Molière).

The character of one's life is determined by, and stands revealed in, the character of the will. In all questions of morals we come back to the will and fasten moral responsibility there. But as everywhere else, so here too, God's will is law.

"Our wills are ours to make them Thine."

In pragmatism the *concrete* is made the test of the "universal," the particular rules the general, nay produces it. There is no allowance for transcendence, and pragmatism is quite logical, that thus shut up with in the temporal, it claims to be its own test. The sophists are in order again with the well-known Χρη μάτων μέτρον α'νθρωπος. The pragmatist proclaims an anti-absolute movement, as pragmatism should claim

"the right to participate in the construction as well as in the execution of the ideal."

Professor Moore treats this discussion frankly and ably in his *"Pragmatism and its Critics."* In reply to the statement of Professor Royce (in *The world and the Individual,* I 460 ff.) that the absolute although inclusive of all possible purposes, is still selective, he proposes two questions: I. How can the absolute purpose be "all-inclusive" and still be selective, as psychologically a purpose must be? II. This all-inclusive purpose is, at the same time, its own fulfillment. Professor Moore's insistence to be able to solve the metaphysical problem with the psychological data available suffices for him to reject the absolutist philosophy. He states: "What puzzles the pragmatist is to see why we should still be working at this organization, if it were absolutely complete and final. To answer by an appeal to 'the finite standpoint' seems a *petitio* of the simplest type" (p. 137). With transcendency gone, teleology loses its *raison d'être.* He urges further that the absolutist's conception does not furnish any definite indication toward the absolute goal beyond the assurance that there *is* such a final goal, and refers to Bradley's statement, that we cannot tell whether we are making for the goal, or away from it. The direction of the final goal is known and can be known to NO finite being. All these questions are certainly pertinent from the rationalist standpoint. If the supernatural is brought within the compass of experience, psychology should claim precedence over metaphysics, explain all, and a "transcendent purpose" would be inadmissible. Professor Moore, therefore, finds the statement of Professor Baldwin puzzling, when the latter asks, "How can practical life adequately test the validity of modes which essentially claim to transcend

the experience of real life?" He puts this critical question, "Waiving at present the problem of the relevance of an ideal not constructed in the process in which it functions, is not participation in the construction of the plan we are to help carry out the very basis of moral responsibility? How is it possible to feel responsible for the mere execution of a purpose which we have not helped to form? And is it not strange that a plan which we have helped to construct should have any less authority and binding force than one ready made and given?" (p. 266).

It will be observed here that the final goal is revealed in Him who said, "I am the way, the truth and the life." The circumstance that this revelation is received only by saving faith rules out all rational approaches. Within the finite experience the Infinite speaks, however, and the relevance of the ideal constructions is, that they are our own as to the forms. We help instrumentally to form these ideal constructions but *sub numine Dei.* Moreover that an ideal which is not only as to its form, but in its nature and origin our own, should have less binding force and authority than one which stands over us, and yet is of us, seems quite plain. An ideal which is wholly of our own creation seems a mere abstraction of the natural function of the individual in the *situation.* Pragmatists, however, work with two values of the *concrete situation* to meet the time-honored *individual* and *universal* elements in experience of the old school. If all transcendence, however, is denied, there is no room for these two values, for if experience is self-containing, then it contains also these relations which knit it to other *concrete situations,* other parts of *real life.*

Nietzsche a Logical Atheist. Nietzsche, *"der Atheist in logischer Reinkultur,"* is the most consistent dis-

claimer of bonds, and binding law. The *"Herrenmoral"* for his *"Übermensch"* is *"Jenseits von Gut und Böse."* (*Werke, Band* VII). Thus he observes: *"Wer noch an einen Gegensatz von Gut und Böse glaubt, der hangt immer noch im Netz des alten Gottesglaubens; wer gebrochen hat mit dem Glauben an einen Gott, der kann nur noch reden von förderlich und hinderlich im Blick auf irgend ein Ziel."* This is consistent pragmatism and this radical of modernity proclaims boldly: *"Was sind denn diese Kirchen noch, wenn sie nicht die Grüfte und Grabdenkmäler Gottes sind!"* In his *"Also sprach Zarathustra"* the tables of the law are broken, to be rewritten at one's own discretion. Characteristic is also in Zarathustra his so-called *"trunkenes Lied," "in den Stundenschlag der Uhr eingefasst."*

"O Mensch! Gib Acht!
Was spricht die tiefe Mitternacht?
Aus tiefem Traum bin ich erwacht:
Die Welt ist tief,
Und tiefer als der Tag gedacht.
Tief ist ihr Weh—
Lust—tiefer noch als Herzeleid:
Weh spricht, Vergeh,
Doch alle Lust will Ewigkeit
Will tiefe, tiefe Ewigkeit!"

Nietzsche's admirers extoll *"das trunkene Lied"* as the profound expression that the deepest wisdom recognizes joy as the essence of life.

The Role of Desire.—Except this *enfant terrible* of the modern school, most thinkers, however, moderate the claims of happiness and pleasure, and the consequent role of desire in life.

Fichte. Fichte urged constantly upon his pupils: "We are not to strive to be happy, but to strive to be worthy to deserve happiness." Happiness thereby becomes a *by-product* of right living.

Hegel. The Hegelian theorem "Human desire is the personal in evolution of existence" is explained by Calderwood thus: "The intelligent agent desires, not a thing outside himself, but self-satisfaction, that is enlargement of being self-realization." (*Handbook of Moral Philosophy,* p. 141). This, in spite of the difficulties of the Hegelian system in doing justice to the "subjective mind," would make desire subservient to self.

Bradley. F. H. Bradley, one of the ablest among English Hegelians, says: "What is clear at first sight is that to take virtue as a mere means to an ulterior end, is in dire antagonism to the voice of the moral consciousness . . . to do good for its own sake is virtue." (*Ethical Studies,* pp. 56, 59). He allows thereby that to which all consciousness testifies to be an objective obligatory ideal.

J. S. Mill. Similarly J. S. Mill declares: "The mind is not in a right state unless it loves virtue as a thing desirable in itself," and admits that the idea of duty is *now* distinct from the idea of happiness.

Kidd Criticized. Beniamin Kidd holds that desire may be for self-gratification as well as for self-realization, while self-realization consists in the satisfaction of self as determining the desire, self-gratification consists in the satisfaction of desire to which the self has been subjected (*Morality and Religion*). Mr. Kidd evidently recognizes legitimate and illicit desires, which restrict the unlimited claim of desire as such. In the Kantian view of a self-legislative morality where the imperative is constitutive of the mind, yet holds aloof

from desire, even as a subservient factor in ethical behavior the phrases "self as determining the desire," and "desire to which the self has been subjected" might be explained. In Kidd's definition, however, they are vague, superficial terms. The desires are expressive of and function in the formation of character. In Hegelian sense, as Calderwood uses the term *self* above, the self as subjective mind is under law of the objective mind, as often, expressed, the self *is* the objective mind become subjective. We can understand these terms both in Kantian and in Hegelian sense, but as Mr. Kidd uses them: "self as determining the desire," = self-satisfaction, "desire to which the self has been subject" = self-gratification, it is meaningless jargon. Instead of explaining the idea, he is playing with the words *satisfaction* and *gratification* as added to the word self. Both refer to the self and Kidd's distinction is wholly unwarranted, as if the one desire should be ruled by self, and the other desire instead rule the self. Even, if etymological meanings should be given decisive weight in philosophical explanation Mr. Kidd must refer both *satis* (enough) and *gratus* (pleasing) equally to the self in *facere* (to make), and has in his evolutionary ethics no warrant for his distinction. If one should substitute the word *character* for the word *self* his definition would acquire meaning in his system. Character is, however, manifestly not the *"fons et origo"* of the moral act. In the expressions of will the character of a self stands revealed. This character is more determined by acts of will than cause of them, but it is never its source. Man forever acts with free personal responsibility to a personal God, *"sub numine dei viget."* Disciplined hearts are developed with man under the law of God! "Out of the heart are the issues of life!" "With the heart man believeth unto righte-

ousness!"

The Ten Commandments. In this light, the relation of the tables becomes significant; the duties of man to God take precedence over those which he owes to his fellowmen. The first table has reference to the worship of God, who is to be revered and honored in I. His Person, II. His worship, III. His name, IV. His day, V. His representatives.

The second table has reference to the service of man, who is to be protected in regard to VI. His life, VII. His family, VIII. His property, IX. His character, and this X. in thought and intent as well as act. As Christ thus summed up: "Love thy God with all thy heart, with all thy mind and with all thy strength (first table), and thy neighbor as thyself (second table). On these hang all the law and the prophets."

VI. God's Will the Law of Christian Ethics

In Christian philosophy one might properly speak of being determined by the law of life. Christian ethics provides man with an objective norm, as in our conscience we feel the impression of God's holy presence upon the heart of man. Through our indivisible spiritual nature we are in direct, personal relation with God, and experience His relation to us. Augustine rightly emphasized that the first point of all certitude is in consciousness, that the home of truth is in man. Drawing the attention from the external world, he focussed it upon the inner consciousness, exclaiming: "God, Thou hast created us unto Thyself, and our hearts are restless within us till they find rest in Thee!" "For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul? Or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?" Indeed, the gospel ever

urges in loving appeal upon man his soul-concern as his sole concern.

It thereby sets aside all computations and contrivances of philosophies of virtue. God speaks and man must obey. The objective *thou shalt* of old was in its corresponding subjective *I ought* often worked out in the legalism of pharisaic contrivance after a utilitarian fashion, as indeed, the *thou shalt* has been rendered ever since into eudaemenism where not fully recognized in its binding authority. Out of life's experiences may be gathered wisdom unto life eternal. Therefore we should apply our hearts to wisdom. Evidences show us, as the inner verdict tells us, that no one less than God awaits our decision, and that an inevitable judgment attends our conduct.

Proverbs in its urgent appeal to stand in the fear of the Lord takes particular notice of the disasters attending a life of sin. Yet, the main stress is laid on the motive, "Keep thy heart with all diligence for out of it are all the issues of life," and "He that sinneth against me wrongeth his own soul; all they that hate me love death." It becomes plain that even a cursory perusal of the book of Proverbs dispels the charge of its ethics being utilitarian.

Criticism of Scope of Pleasure and Desire in Life. People cannot make themselves the judges of virtue. The proneness of human nature to incline towards pleasure and enjoyment, sometimes called psychological hedonism, brings all hedonistic ethics inevitably down to the level of the actual, and thereby the hedonistic theories cease to be ethics by being no more normative. Kant was fully aware of these dangers. As Höffding observes: "Kant has become increasingly convinced that the happiness of the individual affords not test of the value of historical development." (*History of Philos-*

ophy, p. 77). This circumstance may shed light on the rigorism of his ethics. There is, to be sure, the too sadly evident fact that humanity is prone to hunt for pleasure, but it does not follow, because mankind is so apt to indulge consciously in this pursuit, that it ought to practice pleasure as it does. It is urged on all sides in justification of acts that are felt to be questionable, "everybody is doing it," "others do it too," but evidently not on ethical grounds. Kant, wisely erected in his system a barrier against the pleasure pursuit which our natures only too readily take up. We are to learn to will our duty, not to shape our duties to our wills! Then our alleged duties are too often simply our desires. Not whatever satisfies desire, or yields gratification, pleasure, is good. Desire itself is to be brought to a test. When pleasure-pursuit is subjected to a test superior to that of gratified desire, pleasure as a guiding principle is ruled out of court.

Professor Palmer. Professor Palmer discusses this in *The Nature of Goodness* as follows: "In all good we find satisfaction of desire. But the definition is yet vague and inadequate. We still need some standard to test the goodness of desires. Desires are not detachable facts. Each is significant only as a piece of life. In connection with that life it must be judged. And when we ask if any desire is good or bad, we really inquire how far it may play a part in company with other desires in making up a harmonious existence. By its organic quality, accordingly, we must ultimately determine the goodness of whatever we desire. But we cannot reverse the statement and assert that whatever satisfies desire will be organically good. Each object (and person, conjunct self) has relationships and through these is knitted into the framework of the universe. Pleasure probably is nothing else but the

sense that some one of our functions has been appropriately exercised. Every time, that a volition has been carried forth in the complex world and there conducted to its mark (and, we would add, taken its inward effect) a gratified feeling arises." This reduces pleasure to an incident expression of the proper discharge of our function, our duty, "given us"—Prof. Palmer tells us, "by something we cannot alter, fully estimate or with damage evade."

Professor Felix Adler. Professor Felix Adler, leader of the Ethical Culture Society, similarly discounts pleasure, when he says in *Life and Destiny*: "It is said that we live in order to make the world better, but this phrase is ambiguous. Often it is used as referring merely to an increase of the sum of human pleasure. And this would be an aim by no means comparable in grandeur and sublimity to that which religion in the past has set up. The sole fact that we demand unselfishness in action assures us that the standard of enlightened self-interest is false. The higher life is as real as the grosser things in which we put our trust. But our eyes must be anointed so that we may see it." Victor Hugo exclaims even with eloquent climax: "It is a terrible thing to be happy! How being in the possession of the false aim of life, happiness, we forget the true aim, duty!"

Opposing Definitions of the Ethical Life. It becomes abundantly clear that we should affirm emphatically against the modern moralities which make pleasure the law of life and enthrone desire its king; that the ethical life, far from being a primrose path determined by transient pleasures, should be taken rather as exacting duty under the demands of the Infinite and Eternal!

Pain and Pleasure Bound up in Life. It is well to

remember that as man has a capacity for pleasure, so he has a capacity for pain. Emerson even affirmed that the rank of man in nature is his capacity for pain. Moreover pain and pleasure are not so sharply distinguished as one would be led to believe at first thought. Many an exquisite pain is mingled with pleasurable sensations, and the keenest pleasure is often akin to pain. According to an Old Dutch saw, espousing pleasure as a guide in life leads to pain.

"Genot is zoo luttel
En smart is zoo veel
Bij de jacht naar het eerste
Wordt't laatste ons deel."

Theory and Practice not always Exact Counterparts. It goes without saying that the exponents of these hedonistic theories are fortunately not all consistent in their practice. We may grant readily that many a hedonist has come in practice nearer the Garden of Gethsemane, than to an Epicurean sty. Some people are not so bad as their profession would make us believe, though mostly people are not so good as their profession or appearance. Besides we always may apply in practice character as a test of doctrine, as much as doctrine as a test of character.

VII. Apparent Contradictions in Hedonism, Alleged Paradoxes

The paradox of hedonism refers to pleasure as an illusive end. In popular statement it runs: "He that seeks pleasure shall lose it." More specifically the paradox is urged as meaning that pleasure, consciously entertained and pursued with deliberate anticipation,

must forever disappoint, because, though we may plan for it, we cannot control its realization, since pleasure as a consciously entertained end, discounts itself so far forth as it is made the end of conscious effort by its reaction upon the pursuing agent. Common experience seems to indicate this when in its disappointed pleasure it explains: "Perhaps I expected too much." When expectation is on the strain it is hardly ever realized. This failure in hedonistic practice assumes a subjective reference. Man's nature sports with the hedonistic attempts. If one is not even sure of securing the single definite pleasurable state of self, and in order to succeed must keep his eye off it, much less can he prolong the happy state or make it constant so as to render man really happy. Even if pleasure could be so gained, the method of securing it by avoiding to entertain it consciously, would constitute the monumental paradox; who wishes pleasure must not wish for it. One would do the hard things of life to obtain its sweet things. This would be perhaps sounder philosophy, but the paradox remains, and its psychology is stultifying. For who would go in for the hard tasks of life with his eyes on the pleasant things of life? Pleasure-seeking is naturally a selfish affair, and thus bars the agent's way to share with or impart to others, it inclines to exclude sympathetic effort. Here the paradox appears again in the circumstance that those who as universal hedonism or the utilitarian ethics would set up for themselves "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" are hindered by the *amour-propre*. Its charity begins at home to stay there.

The paradox of hedonism becomes less apparent when a strongly materialistic standpoint is assumed. Then one may aim consciously at pleasure by whatever stimuli will gratify the senses. The crass pleasures,

however, are least expressive of personality, and more of the animal order. Yet even these are only realized within limits, dependent as they are upon the physiological nature of the agent. These very safeguarding limits, however, are threatened by the pleasure indulgent agent. Thus appears another hedonistic paradox in that the pleasure hunt is liable to outrun itself, and defeat its purpose, entailing as it does, inevitably discounting results. One must count the results of the indulged gross pleasures against the pleasures themselves.

In the rationale of an act, its consequences should be included, otherwise life would be treated as a piecemeal affair, which it evidently is not. Not only does the pleasure search of grosser nature, or even the most refined self-seeking entail discounting results, nay the very capacity for pleasure is limited, and is endangered by a free indulgence, which must result from setting up pleasure if not as an unintermittent, at least as the dominating aim of life. Thus the paradoxical warning sounds again: "He that seeks pleasure may lose it as an ultimate end," because physiological limitations forbid. The pleasure principle must be stated in deference to these natural barriers. Strange that pleasure should be proclaimed a principle of life, when it thus runs counter to the nature both of body and mind. Could one even imagine such to be the case with virtue? Must not all this prattle about pleasure forever pale by the side of Christ's injunction: "Be ye therefore perfect even as your father which is in heaven is perfect?" Unconditioned, unabated stands forever the law of life announced by Him who also declared: "I am the Way, the Truth and the Life."

The plain truth of the matter is that hedonism has no real paradox at all. A paradox is a seeming con-

tradiction, but a truth in fact. Hedonism itself never announced a paradox. Instead the objections and difficulties which ever stand in the way of the pleasure theory were urged against hedonism. When life is turned into a pleasure pursuit the folly of hedonism becomes at once apparent. To maintain in the face of these facts hedonism as an ethical principle involved the contradictions which wrongly have been called paradoxes. They are misnomers, one and all.

The Paradox is of Faith, but never Rationalistic. Moreover rational ethics have no place for the paradox. A paradox savors too much of the unexplained and unexplored. It belongs to the realm of faith to say: *"credo quia absurdum, credo ut intelligam."* The real paradox in ethics, however, is proclaimed by the authority of Christ himself. The Christian paradox: "He that findeth his life shall lose it: and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it," is found with all four evangelists.

The paradox occurs with hardly any modification. (*Matthew* 10:39; 16:25; *Mark* 8:35; *Luke* 9:24; 17:33; *John* 12:25). At the outset it should be observed that in strong contrast with rational ethics, Christian ethics commands human obedience not so much because the acceptance of the Christian rule promises to yield rich rewards to life—though it fulfills life's aspirations beyond expectation—but rather because it assumes a rightful claim upon man. This claim, however, is to be answered freely and from the heart. Christ's power over man is not in the first place in what He promises unto man, but in what He asks of him. Motive and mainspring, standard and aim of all Christian endeavor remains forever God's holy will. In Christian ethics therefore is no place for bartering

expediency. God will not have hirelings in his service.

Calvin's Argument. Thus Calvin urged with insistent logic the weight of good works out of court as a consideration in man's salvation, declaring that man shall be saved, "Not without works, yet not by works."

VIII. Biblical Content of the Christian Paradox

The setting of the paradox makes it very explicit that Christ puts demands upon man. *Prima facie* He presents to his followers the Christian life as unconditional, sacrificial devotion to Him. Immediately preceding the paradox Christ warns his disciples that they must not think of a life of ease and reward.

Paradox in Matthew 10:39; 16:25. "Think not that I came to send peace on earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword! For I come to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law: and a man's foes shall be they of his own household. He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me; and he that loveth son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me. And he that doth not take his cross and follow after me, is not worthy of me." (Matthew 10:34-39). After this insistent and extreme demand, the reassuring paradox follows contrasting the seemingly hard and uncompromising Christian law of life with the soft moralities that lie so near the natural heart, of which the Pharisees and Scribes made so much then, as they do now. It sounds a warning to the worldling, whilst it reassures the follower of Christ: "He that findeth his life shall lose it; and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it."

In a similar relation the paradox appears again in Matthew 16:25: "From that time began Jesus to shew unto his disciples how that he must go unto Jerusalem, and suffer many things of the elders and the chief priests and scribes, and be killed." When in connection with the statement of the Lord's supreme sacrifice Peter retorts: "Be it far from thee, Lord: this shall never be unto thee." Christ rejects the worldly viewpoint which would avoid suffering sharply, saying unto Peter, "Get thee behind me, Satan: thou art a stumbling block unto me: for thou mindest not the things of God, but the things of men." "Then said Jesus unto his disciples, 'If any man would come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me.'" The demand is sacrifice unto death—as Christ was about to show it in His life—it is foregoing all the world's enjoyments, the breaking of worldly ties and relations, an unreserved, unconditional surrender of the heart's allegiance to come after Christ, to deny himself, to take up his cross, to follow him even unto death. It is a hard road to travel. But the reassurance of the King of the soul is, that he can and will deliver the soul "and what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?" The more insistent the paradox becomes. "For whosoever would save his life shall lose it: and whosoever shall lose his life for my sake shall find it."

Paradox in Mark: 8:35. In Mark the paradox has the same setting as in Matthew 10:25. It follows the incident of Peter's rebuke and Christ's subsequent exhortation to the disciples to prepare for sacrifice. It is useless to attempt another way. "For whosoever would save his life shall lose it; and whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the gospel's shall save it." The affirmation follows which holds up the soul as of price-

less value. Therefore worldly concerns should recede before the claims of Christ, who addresses himself to the soul. Life does not consist in the abundance of things a man possesses.

Paradox in Luke: 9:24; 17:33. "For what doth it profit a man, to gain the whole world, and forfeit his life?" The paradox is a similar setting in Luke 9:24.

In Luke 17:33 the paradox is preceded by the mention of the judgment on the generation of Noah's day, and of Lot's, emphasizing the seriousness of the judgment attending our choice in reference "to the day that the Son of man is revealed." There must be no divided allegiance, no shrinking back into perdition. Remember Lot's wife: "whosoever shall seek to gain his life shall lose it: but whosoever shall lose his life shall preserve it."

God and the Soul Necessary Basis of Ethics. In all these statements God and the soul are strikingly brought forward at the two supreme concerns of life. This circumstance is in singular contrast with rationalistic ethics. Newman well observed, "I could not believe in my own existence without believing also in Him who lives as a personal, all-seeing, all-judging being in my conscience." God and the soul are the factors in the ethical life which theologians consider primarily. When the soul is slighted, or God's claims are put out of sight, we are dealing with the world as it is not; we are left in a hard grinding causal nexus of mechanical procedure. But neither God, nor the soul, nor the world-order is thus explained. The able and candid scholar Romanes experienced this, and in the later years of his life retraced his steps, and recognized again the importance of the soul. Nietzsche reduces *"das Seelending" to a "Begleiterscheinung."* James concludes an essay: *Does Consciousness Exist?* with the

bold assertion that "consciousness is but the faint rumor left behind the disappearing soul upon the air of philosophy." Professor Leuba in a recent inquiry of scientists regarding their belief in personal immortality, the corrolary of belief in the soul, was mostly answered in the negative. It shows how far the modern mind has grown away from the biblical standards of belief. What the modern mind treats as problematical, or even as non-existent is the cornerstone of Christian ethics in its biblical paradox.

Before the soul-interests, worldly consideration must recede. There must be a willingness even to die, in order to live. Man's response to this extreme demand is rendered in faith. Abraham, the man of faith, received the promise of a large posterity against all rational expectations. Again he rendered the supreme sacrifice in his willingness to offer up his son Isaac, the pledge on which this promise was dependent. Evidently rational ethics finds a stumbling block where the injunction prevails, to die to live.

Paradox in John: 12:25. In John's evangel this finds fitting illustration where the Christian paradox is preceded by the declaration: "Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except a grain of wheat fall into the earth and die, it abideth by itself alone; but if it die it beareth much fruit." Thus Christ proclaims: "He that loveth his life loseth it; and he that hateth his life in this world shall keep it unto life everlasting."

DISCUSSIONS ON DAMNATION

I. Present Day Tendency to Ignore this Particular Subject

WHEN Dr. Parkhurst, of New York, declared in plain terms in a sermon his belief in a punishment hereafter, there was considerable comment in the public journals on this unusual utterance.

Plain statements are usually not indulged in when they declare disagreeable facts. It is more customary to shelve the cutting truth for the pleasant commonplace, or sometimes for expedient falsehoods. Limp and lavender liberalism has well-nigh put out of sight the solemn things of future retribution. The "new theologies," as conceited and puffed up as they are shallow and empty, have taught people to disbelieve in a God of justice. They are the outcome of a desire to put the serious elements of life out of sight. Austere and stern things are disagreeable intruders in lives of ease, pleasure, and plenty. The natural man dislikes them.

Yet, in every life there come moments when solemn thoughts strike the most frivolous nature with awe at life's mystery, running with irreversible course to its destiny. The impression of the implacable power of death, the fear of judgment, yea, the fear of the Lord steals at times upon the most indifferent creatures. God has left His witness in the human heart. God Himself says that the godless have no peace of soul (Isa. lvii. 21). And the worldly-wise endeavor in vain to silence the inner voice of the heart. True is the remark of Felix Dahn: "Joy brings us to the pagan world, but pain and sorrow lead us back to Christ."

In the midst of enjoyment, and in the frenzied search

after happiness, then are intimations with us that we are not made for a butterfly existence. "Thou, O Lord, has created us unto Thy-self, and our hearts are restless within us, till they find rest in Thee!" In the wayward wanderings of undisciplined hearts the Augustinian cry rises with solemn warning. The injunction of conscience against a grovelling existence in the lower things of sense and poorer things of time is an unwelcome reminder of the life that excels sense and outreaches time. The thought that "God hath set eternity in our hearts" (Eccles. iii. 11, American Stand. Rev.) must recede from the minds for the sake of undisturbed and unhampered enjoyment of the world here and now.

How significantly is the importance of the thought of the unseen future brought home in the pact of Goethe's Faust:

Mephistopheles says:

"I bind myself to be thy servant *here,*
To run and rest not at thy beck and bidding;
And when we meet again in *yonder place,*
There, in like manner, shalt thou be my servant."

To which Faust replies:

"That *yonder* place gives me but small concern;
When thou hast first shattered this world to atoms,
There may be others then, for aught I care.
All joys, that I can feel, from *this earth flow,*
And this sun shines upon my miseries!"

Naturally, we wish diminished, the severity of religious convictions concerning duty and obligation, right and wrong, and concerning the authority of the

Unseen which places a strict and exacting task-master over our likes in this world. Thus it is that people want a God of such love as to humor a gain-saying and disobedient people in their wicked ways of selfish indulgence. If it were possible, all would naturally join in the sentiment of the Oriental unbeliever, Omar Khayyam:

"Hush, he is a jolly good fellow, it will all be well;" or say with John Hay of the heroic Jim Bludso:

> "He seen his duty, a dead-sure thing,—
> And went for it thar and then;
> And Christ ain't a-going to be too hard
> On a man that died for men."

The vendors of "new truths," as modern radicals love to style the disguised, perennial doubts and shallow mutterings of a sceptical age, have acted the part of the Devil's Advocate for the church member of the average morality. They try to jest away the serious issues of life, and endeavor to sophisticate the accusations of a guilty conscience. The unpopular truths of the Gospel are not emphasized, or they are even omitted.

We are reminded of the remarks of Charles II that he could not think God would make a man miserable only for taking a little pleasure out of the way, and that virtue was simply a trick by which clever hypocrites imposed upon fools.

Edwin D. Mead, Boston's ablest religious liberal, however, perceives the strength and power which the orthodox faith derives from this tenet of punitive justice. He points out that "The God of Calvin, like the God of Jesus Christ, was a consuming fire, and the soul which alone can abide his coming is the soul that has

purified itself by self-control and self-denial, by discipline and devotion. Struggle alone, desperate, persistent struggle, not drifting, could take one into the Kingdom of God. None of your easy feeling, that we are all sure to be taken care of somehow and that it will somehow be all right in the end. O, none of that decoying, devil's optimism for the Puritan. To him the way of life was indeed a straight and narrow way, life was a battlefield, his soul the theatre of a mighty conflict between the powers of light and the powers of darkness." We should observe however that in this appreciation of the orthodox, Mr. Mead betrays at the same time that he thinks their belief wholly a thing of the past. Thus those who have broken entirely with the Bible often give a more unbiased exegesis than most new theologies construct. The naked truth must be kept afar.

Is it any wonder that many are to-day actually startled at the bare mention of the awful doom which awaits impenitent sinners?

It is well known that the Lisbon earthquake supplied the theme of Voltaire's *"Poème sur le désastre de Lisbonne."* By it that deistic age was aroused to the discussion of individual and universal responsibility. John Morley in his fine work on Voltaire observes, that "Voltaire protests against the delusion of forcing the course of the world's destiny into a moral formula that shall contain the terms of justice and mercy in their human sense." He hurled this poem and his *Candide* against the easy-going optimism in which Leibnitz and Pope made light of the problem of evil. A theodicy which readily fitted everything into the best of possible worlds was a challenge which complacent deists put before men in their day, and which pantheistic theories place before us now. One may observe in this con-

nection the well-known statement of Campbell's *New Theology* to the effect that the life of the drunkard and the reprobate is only a mistaken quest after God.

The highest arbiter in the case, the guilt-burdened conscience, however, pronounces this quest away from God, and not merely a mistake. Whether evil is treated as essential to finite being, or as an illusion, or its seriousness is minimized with an appeal to God's love, —in all these attitudes an effort is apparent to get rid of this vexing problem. If sin is considered a trifling thing, a "misapplied desire," "unfortunate ignorance," or "pitiable weakness," or even "undeveloped good," and not a wilful defiance of, a deliberate disobedience to God, then surely such minor matters should not invoke severe penalties from a God of love.

I cannot help recalling the wholesome effect which a brilliant young student from over the sea, Rev. Guthrie, with his old-fashioned notion of sin, exerted in Yale Divinity School several years ago. It was after Dr. Lyman Abbott who had been lecturing there, had given his opinion, that in our modern age people had a consciousness of *sins,* not of *sin.* He usually felt, if he could live a past day over again, he would live it precisely as he had done before. This liberal teacher has given the following exegesis of the well-known text, "Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth where moth and rust doth corrupt and where thieves break through and steal": "And no sensible American does. Moth and rust do not get at Mr. Rockefeller's oil wells, nor at the Sugar Trust's sugar, and thieves do not often break through and steal a railway, or an insurance company, or a savings bank."

Would Dr. Abbott give precisely this explanation over again, knowing that Upton Sinclair, of *The Jungle,* would attack his procedure ferociously, de-

manding space in *The Outlook* for a more literal interpretation, and the declaring: "Dr. Lyman Abbott has traduced and betrayed Jesus Christ by the most amazing piece of theological knavery that it has ever been my fortune to encounter?" He surely could save himself the trouble of hiding behind inane generalities, avoiding the point.

In his recent book *Reminiscences* Lyman Abbot bares strikingly his ultra-radical, shallow modernism. In the preface he says: "I have written these reminiscences in the hope that the simple account of what one man, without pretension to either genius or notable scholarship, has been able to do in aiding his fellow-men to just conclusions and right action in troublous times, may be of use to others who, coming after him, will be called on to meet similar difficulties and solve similar problems." At the conclusion of the book he asks: "Ought we to go alway through life condemned of ourselves and thinking and feeling that God must condemn us? . . . . We may be self-approved and not self-satisfied. We may be dissatisfied and yet not self-condemned. . . . It is thus at eighty years of age that I look back upon the years that have passed since I imbibed something of the spirit of faith and hope and love in my grandfather's home in Farmington. I am far from satisfied with this review; but I am not self-condemned. I say to my Father, as I say to myself: 'I have often been defeated, but I have fought the good fight; I have often faltered and fallen, but I have kept up the race; I have been besieged all my life with doubts, and they still sometimes hammer at the gates, but I have kept my faith.' "

To show how much better an appreciation the French deist had of the problem than most of our modern theologians, we quote some characteristic parts:

"Comment concevoir un Dieu, la bonté même
Qui prodigua ses biens à ses enfants qu' il aime,
Et qui versa sur eux les maux à pleines mains?
Quel oeil peut pénétrer dans ses profonds desseins?
Il ne vient point d'autrui puisque Dieu seul est maître,
De l'être tout parfait le mal ne pouvait naître.
Il existe pourtant. O tristes vérités!
O mélange étonnant de contrariétés!
Aux cris demi-formés de leurs voix expirantes,
Au spectacle effrayant de leurs cendres fum antes,
Direz-vous: C'est l'effet des éternelles lois,
Qui d'un Dieu libre et bon nécessitent le choix?
Direz-vous, en voyant cet amas de victimes:
Dieu s'est vengé, leur mort est le prix de leurs crimes?
Quel crime, quelle faute ont commis ces enfants
Sur le sein maternel écrasés et sanglants?
Lisbonne, qui n'est plus, eut-elle plus de vices
Que Londres, que Paris, plongés dans les délices?
Lisbonne est abimée, et l'on danse à Paris.

The Rev. Dr. Parkhurst said, in the sermon referred to above: "The God of love in 1755 destroyed 50,000 persons in the Lisbon earthquake. If a man will not accept God's moral laws, then I should say that God will damn him; and I further say *that God ought to damn* him. If God burns up a body he will burn up a soul that gets in the way of his moral laws."

This expresses in plain, homely speech the traditional belief of Christian people, who surely have shown that they were not made of stone. One may even say that they were the more loving and tender for this belief in God's unflinching justice, while yet they recognized His love and goodness. For as God's justice is to be feared, so is His goodness to be loved. Goethe well said: "There is no protection against excellence ex-

cept Love." The wise man said: "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom;" and love is its conclusion, the fulfilment of the Law. Therefore, "If you wish to flee from God, flee to God."

How true are the appealing words of the unhappy Chatterton when he poured out his soul in the sad struggles of his young life:

"Oh, teach me in the trying hour,
When anguish swells the dewy tear,
To still my sorrows, own thy power,
Thy goodness love, thy justice fear!"

The wisdom of the world is of a kind which does not fear the Lord. Its considerations are concerned with the things seen. The actual doings of men are the standard for the man of the world. He chooses rather to follow the opinions of men than to obey the dictates of conscience.

The natural man will not acknowledge restraint. Such men proclaim themselves emancipated, and are freed even from the most delicate sense of awe. In some of these circles of unbelieving emancipationists, even the lenient moral restrictions of men as they go, to which Psalm I refers, are set aside. But let none forget that, instead of yielding to the restraint of fear of the Lord and His awe, the swaggering, blaspheming infidels cow in the most degrading manner under the conventional codes of men! Reversing the Biblical injunction, they are more obedient unto men than unto God. And so they fear men more than God, in spite of the Saviour's warning words, that they should rather fear Him who can destroy the soul as well as the body.

II. Reasons in the Influence of a Perverted Zeitgeist

In this matter much depends on the temper of the age. Our standpoint determines largely our approach to this question. Twenty years or more ago Joseph Cook, one of America's ablest lecturers, declared emphatically and impressively: "If you please, the universe is more serious than is dreamed by men who solace sin by affirming that it never can be too late to mend, and that character does not tend to a free final permanence, bad as well as good. That sentiment is a web woven in the looms of luxury, and gilded there, but one that will not bear the weight of absolute seriousness, conducting research by the scientific method. Whatever outrages science will be found to solace sin."

Bishop Butler well said: "Thus nothing can possibly be more contrary to nature than vice."

The sinning world pays a tribute and an exacted sacrifice to God's glory far more awful than those who offer their days in His voluntary service.

Yet, I remember the gifted and manly orator of the Boston South Congregational Church, Rev. Dr. George Gordon, arraigning the Calvinistic system of presenting the wrath-side of God's nature equally with the love-side to unconverted men. Evidently Dr. Gordon was forgetful of the universal significance and profound truth in the dictum of Lucretius: "It was fear that first made gods in the world." It is the old story over again—one inevitably finds what one is looking for. The times require a God of love at the expense of justice and equity.

But it is a foolish begging of the question to say: "I do not want to believe in a God who will damn the finally impenitent sinner. I do not believe, and I

could not believe, in such a God." There is no argument in this. Simply a disposition expressed does not decide much about the truth of the matter. And that should be our concern. Subjectiveness has, however, bold presumption in an age in which the man-side of religion is over-emphasized.

Perhaps this is the main reason why Pauline theology is so distasteful to the modern mind. Paul's rugged logic argues the futility of human claims and efforts before God's sovereignty, and presents salvation as grace. "Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why didst thou make me thus?"

Professor James in his *Pragmatism* (p. 23 f.) ridicules the theodicy of Leibnitz in regard to the damned, mainly on the score that man is too important "to be thrown as sop to the eternal fitness." "It is evident," he says, "that no realistic image of the experience of a damned soul ever had approached the portals of Leibnitz's mind." We want to direct attention, however, to the circumstance that Professor James is quite willing to pay this price in behalf of his pluralistic melioristic scheme. In theoretic vagueness he pleads (p. 295): "May not the notion of a world already saved *in toto* anyhow, be too saccharine to stand? May not religious optimism be too idyllic? Must all be saved? Is no price to be paid in the work of salvation?" "I find myself willing to take the universe to be really dangerous and adventurous." "Those Puritans who answered 'yes' to the question: Are you willing to be damned for God's glory? were in this objective and magnanimous condition of mind." We would observe, however, that this temper does not obtain among liberal minds, and that even those Puritans were not likely to stake so much on the insecure

scheme of pragmatism. Self-regard and utility do not cultivate that magnanimous temper, nor furnish the basis for a belief which would stake own dear self.

In proportion as God is our main concern we will be less concerned about the opinions of men. He who fears God does not fear men, whilst he who stands in fear of man can not obey God. To be truly obedient unto God is to be supreme over men. Obedience to the world tends to create a God in agreement with its doings. When man feels small, God looms up large; when man feels big, God loses His awful majesty. The moods of men differ, and the impress of God upon their minds differs accordingly.

There is, indeed, a valuation by man even of God. A free, moral agent he is, with personal responsibility to a personal God. So far as he responds does he recognize himself as responsible. But exactly on this score it can not therefore be only a question of subjective appreciation. Value-judgments must have objective reference corresponding to our subjective susceptibility. Dorner expresses, profoundly and truly, the quintessence of Christianity when he says, in his great classic *On the Person of Christ* (vol. III, p. 235):

"The idea of the world as it stands eternally before God is not terminated and completed with susceptibility to God, but, according to his unfathomable gracious will, includes also that this susceptibility be absolutely filled in itself; and, at the point where the central fulfilment corresponding to the central susceptibility takes place, the world, too—which, as merely susceptible to God, or even sinful, was outside of God,—entered into the circle of Divine Life, into the life of the triune God himself, even as the immanent Divine Life explicated itself here."

It is quite in order to remind the sentimental preacher of to-day that his subjective valuation is rather unreliable with no other basis than his exhibit of moral, or sometimes immoral, character.

The Rev. Clayton J. Potter, an able Congregational minister, once delivered an impressive sermon on this point from the text which enjoins man against the making of graven images, and on Isaiah's denouncing with scathing ridicule the making of idols. He showed most convincingly how this idolatry of shaping one's God is prevalent now. The stern features, forbidding to human weakness and self-indulgence, are eliminated from the idea of God. People make the very teachings of Christianity fit in with their desire. They compromise the qualities of Christianity. Yet, we are not to fashion our God as we would have Him, but we are to accept Him as He comes to us objectively.

Such a sermonic appeal is, however, in more than one way exceptional in the New England Congregationalism of to-day. The general tone is rather a tactful catering to the good-will of people of respectability, flavored with emotional religious feeling. The liberal preacher is suave, oratorical, of good diction, and literary, sometimes demonstrative in delivery, but almost always an artful dodger of all issues and angular situations. He makes the very God a reflection of his moods and furnishes an illustration to the dictum of the pagan-poet Goethe, that one fashions his God after himself.

"Wie einer ist, so ist sein Gott;
Darum ward Gott so oft zu Spott."

Goethe himself furnishes a striking illustration of the phases of belief in God's punitive righteousness. Most

competent commentators on his *Faust* take it to be a fact that the gifted, dissolute youth had such intimations of his evil doings as to depict himself in the first part of the drama as lost. Only later, when more engrossed in worldly pleasures and less sensitive to the solemn warnings of conscience, did he join the second part to it, as a continuation of the Faust who had sown his wild oats, but was to redeem himself as—

> "The active, ever-striving soul
> Works out his own salvation."

Browning's *Easter Day* leaves us with a closing note of hope. Solemn things are not to be hastily invoked upon another's course:

> "But Easter Day Breaks. But
> Christ rises! Mercy every way
> Is infinite, and who can say?"

Yet, in the poem it is made clear how the grovelling soul is left to its desires, unrestrained by God's Spirit. He who might have judged that the use of the flesh was to refine the nerve beneath the spirit's play, who might have followed "the spirit's fugitive gleams until they issued in the unveiled light of God," has fixed himself, where "God's free Spirit that makes an end" no longer penetrates. The crux of the whole poem is in the lines:

> "I promise not thou shalt forget
> The past now gone to its account,
> But leave thee with the old amount
> Of faculties, nor less nor more,
> Unvisited as heretofore
> By God's free Spirit that makes an end."

Realizing the soul's undying nature, we are made to feel, that "as we are making it now so will it start beyond death with larger powers, a greater scope, an unforgotten past."

In our busily engaged modern life, when the religious stock seems dying out; when the small philosophers scoff at Jonathan Edwards, that master spirit of the "Great Awakening" in New England, because he wrote a sermon on *Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God*—in our age there is little sympathy with the disclosure of the grave things of life. Yet, who can oppose the inevitable, who can debar the truth from access to the soul, or who suppress the facts of our own consciousness?

It may seem strange at first that Dante's picture of hell calls out little antagonism from the public, that Rubens's wonderful canvasses in the Pinakothek in Munich on the subject of *"Höllensturz"* find admiring observers, as do many art-productions on judgment. Yet when we remember the difference between a pictorial representation and an argued, intellectual apprehension of the dreaded theme which forces its thought with compelling realization home to those whose mind is engaged by the subject, we need wonder no more.

I shall long remember the profound impression made by an address in Marquand Chapel by Professor Edward Curtis—when the students said yea to his solemn proclamation with sincere earnestness: "We believe in hell and we ought to preach it!" Alas, few resolved to pass on the old-time solemn warning. It does not sound up-to-date to preach the things that "no one believes any more."

An apt and perfectly analogous rejoinder to this argument against old-time beliefs would be to say that

up-to-date, newfangled notions and theologies are to be discredited because the little babies do not believe them yet! For in these matters much as to actual belief depends on the temperament and disposition. Nevertheless, as truth is the primary concern, the truth on this most momentous question of human destiny ought to be brought forward with utmost distinctness, and pressed with arguments that can not be gainsaid.

III. Reasoned Argument of the Subject

When the current opinion—it is not an argument—is announced, that someone or other "can not believe in a God who punishes the impenitent sinners with eternal damnation," the assertion is usually illustrated by the analogy of an earthly father. We direct special attention to this often adduced comparison of God's punishment with the punishment of a disobedient child by an earthly father.

We may pass by the inconsistency, that those who illustrate thus their belief or opinion usually object to anthropomorphic descriptions of God, of their own use of which this is a most flagrant instance. But we press the point that the supposed analogy begs the question, in assuming to know the relation which it proposes to explain.

In the comparison we are supposed to be the children, and therefore must hold to the relation of the child-mind to the disposition of his offended father; and we can not argue from this position what the heavenly father, taking (on the strength of our comparison) the parental attitude, would do, or would not do. The actual sentiment of the child should be the key in this interpretation, which is that he expects to be punished for wrong-doing. We take for granted here that we

are agreed, that in education, along with the cultivation of positive principles, restraining influence is needed.

Now, parents who do not teach their children "to mind," who always humor their wills and never punish; rear "spoiled children." "Whom the Lord loveth He chasteneth" is the Biblical principle regarding the Heavenly Father.

We know as a fact that disobedient children cast about in their minds, as a protection in contemplated wrong, that father, mother, or teacher will not say, or do anything about it. The evil companion makes his plea for wrong-doing on the same score. Now, to argue thus from the actions of the indulgent, sinful, earthly father towards his children is by a confusion of the terms of the comparison, to assume this to be God's attitude towards His children. In strict keeping with the comparison, we can presume to judge God's dealings in his punitive justice even less than can a child the punishments of his earthly father. But we know that as a certainty both do punish.

So there is in the human heart a deep-lying, unsophisticated sentiment that sin not only is punished—which we can not always see in this world—but that it ought to be punished. Divine justice may challenge faith, but facing facts squarely, we can only render the verdict that God has written doom and damnation for sin and sinners. Men who lead indulgent lives of sinfulness, which forebode awful consequences, may deny the justice of God, and presume to abuse His infinite love with impunity, but it is after all merely practising the foolish trick of the ostrich. All the world echoes the pangs of misery, the groans of evil-doing. Pain and destruction wait on all, and everything that gets in the mills of God will find them, though grinding slowly, yet grinding exceedingly small.

If the belief in God on the part of the man who urges this false analogy is as real and deep as he will insist that it is, he affirms God to be a God of love, and will acknowledge none other. Yea, if this were possible, his God is to be even love without justice. Then how is it that this God can allow so much misery in the world, so much of pain and agony? All theories denying eternal punishment are thus obliged to fly in the face of this awful fact. Indeed, the denial of belief in God's punitive justice, because of His love, involves on the selfsame ground the denial of the existence of evil.

Tennyson proclaimed that—

> "Nature red in tooth and claw
> With ravin shrieks against such creed,"

the creed that God is love at the cost of justice.

The modern unbeliever is forced to revert to and fall back upon the Malthusian theory which teaches that nature settles her accounts with rigid severity, in pitiless manner adjusting the eaters to the food-supply. If he is honestly placing the responsibility for these facts on his God of love, who is not to exercise justice, one may leave with Him the fact of punishment with much more unconcern. But logically, he in reality leaves God out of account in the matters of this world.

Guy de Maupassant forces this fact with mocking sarcasm to the front, and holds it tauntingly before timid modernism, which ignores the solemn, hard facts to give itself to a sentimental dreaming of love without justice. Upon the last page of his last novel, *L'Angelus,* he makes a blasphemous charge to *"Dieu éternel meurtrier qui semble ne gouter le plaisir de produire que pour savourer insatiablement sa passion acharnée*

de tuer de nouveau, de recommencer ses exterminations à mesure qu' il crée des êtres." . . . "Au milieu de cette phrase," his literary editor, Louis Conard, tells us, *"son génie a sombré. Depuis Guy de Maupassant n' a plus rien écrit. Le blasphème a été interrompu par la folie."*

Richard Le Gallienne directs attention to the fact of pain and suffering in his *If I Were God.* Harriet Beecher Stowe gives the following reflections in *The Minister's Wooing:* "They thought it a very happy world before,—a glorious universe. Now it is darkened with the shadow of insoluble mysteries. Why this everlasting tramp of inevitable laws on quivering life? If the wheels must roll, why must the crushed be so living and sensitive?" She makes Mrs. Marvin at the supposed death of her son James exclaim: "Mary, I cannot, will not, be resigned!—it is all hard, unjust, cruel! to all eternity I will say so. To me there is no goodness, no justice, no mercy in anything! Life seems to me the most tremendous doom that can be inflicted on a helpless being! What had we done that it should be sent upon us? Why were we made to love so, to hope so—our hearts so full of feeling, and all the laws of nature marching over us—never stopping for our agony? Why, we can suffer so in this life that we had better never have been born!" "Do I not see the same difficulty in Nature? I see everywhere a Being whose main ends seem to be beneficent, but whose good purposes are worked out at terrible expense of suffering, and apparently by the total sacrifice of myriads of sensitive creatures. I see unflinching order, general good-will, but no sympathy, no mercy. Storms, earthquakes, volcanoes, sickness, death, go on without regarding us. Everywhere I see the most hopeless, unrelieved suffering,—and for aught I see it may be

eternal. Immortality is a dreadful chance, and I would rather never have been." "But if there is a fathomless mystery of sin and sorrow, there is a deeper mystery of God's love." Similar sentiments and argumentation, abounding in literature and life, in every form and degree, should make plain that the fact of suffering and pain as well as evil finds ready acknowledgment, together with that of the existence of God.

A Universalist minister said, in answer to the declaration that God destroyed 50,000 people in the Lisbon earthquake: "I deny it. These human beings were killed because the great physical laws must go on. There is no divine interference, and, I say it reverently, there can be no interference. God even has his metes and bounds."

This is a deistic position, with the additional limitations put upon God's power; it practically affirms that things are fixed once for all. God not merely just beholds the world's course, but, we are told, that He could not interfere. He is bound to the great physical laws. But, as modern explanations go, He does the best under the circumstances, with the means available. As if every last circumstance and factor was not created and controlled by God Almighty! In corroboration, the Agnostic Huxley is quoted: "The Ledger of the Almighty is strictly kept, and every one of us has the balance of his operations paid over to him at the end of every minute of his existence." It is asked: "Can we believe that, in addition to this punishment, God will burn up the erring soul in the fires of an eternal hell? What would be a crime for me would be a crime for God!"

In this argument we start with the view of an impersonal, natural force, which the agnostic physicist acknowledges, with a Nature written large as God-

idea, and then turn, in conclusion, to the sounder conception of the personal God of Christian faith, projected, however, according to wish rather than found.

Two remarks may be made in this connection. It is at least acknowledged that he who gets in the way of God's moral laws will get into trouble to-day and here. Why should there be made such an illogical, sudden break with the sin-stricken man of this world when he passes on; especially by those who trumpet the evolutionary doctrines as the gospel of to-day? Is there, then, not with the soul as well eternal unfolding, unceasing growth, gradual progress, a steady development? It is a confused notion to treat life before and after death as two unrelated or not conjoined entities.

It deserves special notice that this assumed total disruption, not only with the former earthly life, but also rejection of continued identity, or a lurking disbelief in life after death, turns the fact of punishment in this world for most people into an argument against the case to which it bears so plainly witness, viz.: eternal judgment. It is, indeed, the same soul that is damned or saved, and punishments are not outward conditions, but refer to the soul-condition itself.

On every hand one may hear the otherwise stultifying remark: "A man gets all that's coming to him here, and need not wait for a hell or heaven to come after." Unless the unwarranted and unintended assumption of the mortality of souls, as in conditional immortality, is made or implied, such remarks are wholly unmeaning. Omar Khayyam's tirade, in view of the above, is corroborative of eternal damnation:

"I sent my soul through the Invisible,
Some message of that after-life to spell,

And by and by my soul came back to me and said,
I myself am Heaven and Hell."

Cumberland said: "Pain and penalties—as well as also privileges and immunities—are always annexed to laws by the authority which establishes and enacts them. The real obligation of the law arises from the will of some superior."

In a negative way, therefore, as concomitant signs of God's pleasure or disfavor, results attendant upon our actions do point out right and wrong conduct to mankind, as restraining influence by an anticipation of good or evil consequences. Those who do not heed these consequences throughout life, shall have a realization to the full after death.

It is urged often that the Reformers emphasized too strongly the penalties and rewards to be administered by the Sovereign God after death, wholly out of proportion to those inflicted in this life. But so they are. Our hearts condemn us, and God is greater than our hearts. Whatever arguments may be drawn from one-sided, morbid brooding about being in a state of damnation, it is certain that nowadays sin is mostly treated as a matter of consciousness without so much as a reference to its deeper source in the corruption of nature.

The objection is made that selfishness is made too prominent, when fear of punishment and hope of reward are presented as motives to Christian faith, a selfishness which naturally results from this belief in hell and heaven, eternal torment, and everlasting bliss. We observe, however, that *they are not motives;* the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, not the wisdom itself. They are inducements and considerations for the natural man to turn to the straight gate

and to follow the narrow way; leading to piety, but not a part of it.

Yet, why not rather raise this objection to hedonistic and utilitarian ethics, the prudential wisdom of the world? Surely they involve self-regard as the leading motive. These considerations of self in given surroundings, even if they did enter also into the Christian life, fall infinitely below the alleged selfish regard of Christians, who in their motives at least try to please a perfect personality, God; whereas the hedonistic and utilitarian selfishness is like the jelly-fish reacting on outward stimuli.

Those who, in spite of God's visiting spirit, have soiled and tainted their souls win selfish baseness and lust, and with all their heart, not from weakness, but in defiance of God, are glorying in their shame, are, when the curtain drops on the earthly scene, in the hands of God Almighty. What about justice? What about the idea of law, inerring, inevitably sure? Hamlet speaks truly of "the undiscovered country from whose bourn no traveller returns." But by analogy, as there are rewards and punishments here, so there will be hereafter, and that eternal.

Joseph Cook observed in *Current Religious Perils:* "Robert Browning, who is unquestionably the subtlest of the ethical teachers which the poetry of our age has produced, deliberately affirms that our human, earthly choice decides our eternal destiny. He is not a theological partisan. He speaks as Shakespeare would, as a student of the irreversible laws under which character tends to final permanence, good or evil."

"Would a man escape the rod,
See that he turn to God
The day before his death.

Or, could a man inquire
When it shall come, I say,
Then let him turn to-day."
From *Ben Karshook's Wisdom*

Joseph Cook himself renders these reflections well in the following lines:

"Choose I must, and soon must choose
Holiness, or heaven lose.
While what heaven loves I hate
Closed for me is heaven's gate.
Endless sin means endless woe;
Into endless sin I go,
If my soul, from reason rent,
Takes from sin its final bent.
Balance lost, but not regained,
Final bent is soon attained.
Fate is choice in fullest flower,
Man is flexile—for an hour!
As the stream the channel grooves.
And within that channel moves,
So doth habit's deepest tide
Groove its bed, and there abide.
Light obeyed increaseth light,
Light resisted bringeth night.
Who shall give me will to choose,
If the love of Light I lose?
Speed my soul; this instant yield;
Let the Light its scepter wield.
While thy God prolongeth grace
Haste thee towards His holy face."

The attempt is constantly made to dull the sense of responsibility for the issues of life; but the issues of

life immortal are not to be coaxed into terrible delusion by the word "chance," "another chance;" when exactly that word has no longer any application: "As a tree falleth, so it shall lie."

Chances, always new chances, even beyond the grave! As if they ask for chances merely to lose them. As they ask for a loving God just to abuse His love! But with cumulative effect evil conducts a career, works out destiny, more and more towards fixity. We have read life's history well enough to see that even here already chances may have gone irrevocably beyond all human power, and only tears remain for meat. Lives are being lost here and now, out of reach of human help. The sociologists speak of "the submerged tenth," actually sunk so low below the level of common decency that "they cannot reach bottom." They are adrift on the tides of their iniquity. Philanthropy and Christian charity seem to spend their loving efforts in vain. Already reality of what Dante wrote in significant words over his hell appears:

"All hope abandon, ye who enter here!"

It has been argued that salvation viewed as an escape from hell is rather a negative idea, and inadequate for the scope of the Gospel. Salvation from a damnable state and condition is meant, rather than from its dire consequences. In that light salvation is positive as well as negative; saved from hell means saved for heaven.

We should bear in mind here the close relation between a sinful life and the refusal of God's grace. "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him, and he can not know them, because they are spiritually judged." We should remember that precisely refusal of God's

grace results from the sinful condition of heart, and may be viewed in itself punishment, as estrangement from God. The evangelist Moody affirmed that no one is damned because of his sins, but because of his not accepting Christ as his Saviour. The evangelist misstates the case in zealous appeal by overemphasis of Isaiah's plea: "Come now, and let us reason together, saith the Lord; though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be as white as snow; though they be red like crimson, they shall be as wool." It should be borne also in mind, however, that the prerequisite for knowing God is to live a God-like life, to become Christlike is to like Christ; just as to like Christ above all else is to become Christlike. John the evangelist significantly states: "If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine; whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself." The Bible teaches plainly that a man is damned always because of his inherent and adherent sin. Yet, faith in God's grace, the imputed righteousness of Christ blots out these sins, as if they had not been. Therefore "How shall we escape, if we neglect so great a salvation?" The burden of the Gospel is, in fact, that in Christ is the remaking of ruined man. Man, not accepting Christ as his Saviour, shows thereby the sinful condition of his heart, rather than this being the cause of his damnation; but he is damned because of his sinful state. Both points of Moody's statement are therefore in error.

"I will put my laws into their mind
And on their heart also will I write them;
For I will be merciful to their iniquities
And their sins will I remember no more."

In addition to the belief that impenitent sinners will be damned, there is often need of attention to that

other inherent belief that they ought to be damned. It was the great philosopher Kant who sustained "the thought of God" by the inherent, native sense which man has, that each shall get his own. God was for him the necessary postulate to establish the relation between happiness and virtue. Just as good awaits its reward, so evil will not go unpunished. We require a God to see to this, such is in substance Kant's argument. Is there no suggestion in it for eternal retribution? "Whatsoever a man soweth that shall be also reap." "Whosoever transgresses must suffer," and "the way of the transgressor is hard." Ingrained in the very structure of the world is God's law, that evil shall not have a permanent stay.

We point here to the comfort of the thought that the world-government is in the hands of Almighty God, even though it involves a judgment from which there is no appeal, standing as we do before the Judge to whom there is no reply. The thought that after all, absolute equity is being done in the midst of the world's seemingly bewildering distribution of fortunes encourages and cheers the wise in his earthly struggles for the side of the world's Judge. God's judgments are infallible and unfailing. He who knows the hearts holds the balance of justice. Each shall get his own under Divine dispensation. Thus we may leave all to Him, unlike that Universalist minister whose stock in trade was to inveigh against the ideas of God's punitive justice, but who suddenly forgot all his theories, when he learned that some young sinner had betrayed his own daughter. "That man ought to be damned in hell!" he exclaimed. When it was observed that he had always taught there was no such thing as hell and damnation, he retorted in anger, "For such rascals there ought to be hell and damnation." The incident

illustrates how naturally the idea of punishment leaps forward, when the heinousness of sin is brought home to humans, how natural then, not only to hate sin, but the sinner. Sin cannot very well be visited without inflicting punishment upon the sinner.

The Rev. Dr. Parkhurst, in expressing his belief in "damnation," added the statement: "And I further would say that God ought to damn the impenitent sinners."

There is, indeed, a justifiable mood, which does feel satisfaction in seeing sin visited by the wrath of a righteous God. Against the sceptic who disbelieves in God because of the terrible suffering in the world, it may be asserted with quite as much reason, that this awful suffering and misery argues the proof of God's existence. It is the sacrifice of the unconverted, of the wayward, of the sinners to God. He will not bestow His blessings till we do His holy will. And we do it not. Who is there to deny that? The concern about our souls, and our stand before God might well replace our petty anxieties about worldly matters. The modern man needs a little more *Gottanschauung* and less *Weltanschauung*. Only thus might self-secure moralists learn what it means "to be plucked as a brand from the burning."

When a gainsaying and disobedient people raise this insoluble question, Why did God allow mankind to fall in Adam? *Rom.* v. 20, is a pertinent rejoinder: "Where sin abounded, grace did much more abound." Or, we should with practical insistence declare God's "Whosoever will!" and call to mind the utter freedom under which man marks out his own course, being, so far as his will is concerned, unrestrained. Evil and good are of his own choosing; and so must be accepted the consequences: "The wages of sin is death."

We can not consider evil to issue from God, who is of too pure eyes to behold it; nor can we give it independent co-existence with God. Attempts at a unitary conception, or at systematic explanation, may not make us lose sight of the unmistakable facts of consciousness. If consistency would force upon us such a procedure it would indeed be a bugbear of small minds. Such a procedure seems, however, to be advocated by C. C. Haskell, D. D., author of the *New Theology,* whose crude notions equal the crass ignorance of his theological discussion and discrimination. He says in an article: "God's power is limited, hence we have Satan, sin and suffering. There are two kinds of punishments, what God inflicts, as corrective, and what Satan inflicts for his own delight. God's power being limited He can save the one close to Him, much easier than he can the one at a distance."

It is needless to comment, since among intelligent readers no one is inclined to take such unscientific twaddle seriously. We may leave these cut-and-dried, popular notions with their author in "Corry," where they had better remain. Unfortunately much of precisely such superficial explanation catches the crowd, and wins for itself an importance in an unbelieving democracy which it does not merit in itself. With many people the phrase rules; the plausible rather than the true often captures the multitude.

IV. On Judgment in General

It hardly can be denied that the belief in damnation has been abused in its application. The belief is rather for solemn, individual warning than for a ready application to others. God is judge, and knows the hearts. The words of Newton are worth remembering

in this connection: "If ever I shall get into heaven I shall wonder at three things: I that so many will not be there whom I expected surely to find there; II that so many will be there whom I thought would never get there; and III the greatest marvel will be that I, poor sinner, should be the recipient of so much grace as to be admitted."

The severity of eternal damnation is also always contrasted and offset by the loving appeal: "How shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation!"

The most flagrant anomaly in the discussions of this subject by liberals is that they insistently charge the believer in God's punitive justice with cruelty. Whatever they may argue in regard to the fact of punishment, they ought to recognize the circumstance that where God's judgment is so prominently brought forward human judgment naturally recedes. It tempers our condemnatory spirit, our fretful, meddling disposition to interfere with persons and things. We then do not want—as in the case of the Universalist minister—to get first of all at the offender with impassioned hatred against the sinner rather than against sin. We then come to understand: "Avenge not yourselves, beloved, but give place unto wrath: for it is written, 'Vengeance belongeth unto me; I will recompense, saith the Lord.'" When a loving God's judgment in justice damns—the condemnation stands without appeal forever. And though this may be of awe-inspiring solemnity, it delivers us from the fickle, faulty human judgment. "Each one of us shall give account of himself to God. Let us not, therefore, judge one another any more." I am persuaded that those who believe in judgment have less reason for condemnatory judging than those have who, disbelieving in the wrath of God, seem to usurp God's function to themselves.

We all have to learn charitable judgment. For Christian living we must be taught "Judge not that ye be not judged." This utterance does not refer so much to the correctness of judgment as to the charity of its spirit. A man is known in his judgments. Indeed, "as a man thinketh in his heart so is he." A man may be better known by what he says about others than by what others say about him. These judgments, however, generally concur. Thus the addition: "for with what judgment ye judge ye shall be judged," which enforces the command to judge charitably. We are called upon to reflect on the rebound from our judgments as well as from our actions, and to apply also to our judgments the Golden Rule which so fittingly concludes this passage on charitable intercourse.

While criticism makes faults and failures stand out more prominently, it does not remove them. Unless criticism, therefore is exercised in love, and thus rendered helpful by aiding in overcoming the weakness exposed, it is the dire expression of an heartless, pharisaic spirit. No one has a moral right to criticise that in which he is not personally interested! All interference must justify itself in love. Yet, what an appalling amount of energy is expended in cruel, altogether unnecessary, uncalled-for, and always unjust intrusion into the lives of others by self-appointed judges, who wound and inflict pain by the unforgiving condemnation of an elder brother. Thus in many respectability and formal correctness kill with cold pharisaic pride the remainder of virtue, struggling to its feet in a life of sin.

Flagrant violations of law, outright vice and crime involve but a small waste of God-given powers, darken but few lives, compared with the persistent ravages caused by uncharitable judgment, idle gossip, cutting

remarks, the meaningful look of derision, envy, spite, the selfishness of nursed self-importance, ingratitude, treachery, malice, and ill-will. How hateful, where they have arrogated the very amenities of social intercourse, rendering the etiquette of life a meaningless mask, worn on occasion, and at will!

Life's marked failures, the world's evident sinners are comparatively few, while the host of those whose life-blood ebbs away in the sorry doings of a perverted use of righteousness is unnumbered. The pharisaic tendency should be overcome by a deep sense that the rule of right and wrong is primarily for our own personal application. It is a grim irony indeed, that the appearance of virtue should be used as a club to defeat virtue's law. And yet, Emerson's remark is to the point, "Some people know the pitiful art of making virtue odious." Instead of attractive, it becomes forbidding. Hugo says of Jean Valjean, before his heart was mellowed by love, that with all his endeavor for perfection it yet was evident that "he kneeled at the height of his virtue!"

Why should I feel freer to indulge in wrong-doing because some one else does wrong also, and be eager therefore to publish his wrong-doing as an excuse for mine own? Or, again, why should the speaking of another's failings enhance my virtue? More persistent still, if the harm thus done to others is not helping us, should its guilt not weigh all the more upon us?

That is why the public brands all this indifferent, heartless meddling of idle gossips, of vain curiosity, and of itching sensationalism, with that opprobrious, slangy epithet, "rubbering!" For that reason do the young treat with contempt sneaky tattletaling, "squealing," and the telling of tales out of school.

"There is so much good in the worst of us,
And so much bad in the best of us,
That it does not behoove any of us
To speak ill about the rest of us."

If no good can be said, why not keep silent? But above all things why should we carry the bad things we see and hear rather than the good things? Let us cultivate the habit of repeating favorable remarks and take less notice of evil reports. Unfavorable criticism should go directly to the person concerned. Never make yourself an intermediary, or employ one. It savors of cowardice to retail anybody's failings to a third party, and discredits the motives. I am my brother's keeper, not his judge. Let us look for the good in one another, not prefer to observe the bad. In order to do this, let us have more love for one another. Mind another's business only so far, and when we can be helpful. Love, therefore, is an absolute pre-requisite to the observing eye which would reveal his fellow's shortcomings and weaknesses. Moreover people will only allow criticism and reproach on condition that it is really well meant. Inasmuch as all are found wanting when weighed in the balance, all need loving reproof and correction. Yet, we take it only from those near and dear, whom we know to be our friends, and who mean it for our good. Then our faults are brought straight to us without wounding our pride unnecessarily. Most of us will receive correction if we can only feel that love administers it with anxious care, not with delight that fault has been found. Would we Christians had love enough to correct one another!

We should bear in mind the scene of Christ's compassionate judgment. He, the Sinless One, would not

condemn the offender of the law. He alone, who could in justice throw the stone, preferred mercy, staying the heartless justice of the Pharisees by the reminder that they themselves shared in breaking the law.

Portia meets Shylock's clamoring for justice and law with the same plea. The consideration, we would fain receive ourselves, we should, according to life's Golden Rule, be ready to give to others.

> "Therefore, Jew,
> Though justice be thy plea, consider this,
> That in the course of justice none of us
> Should see salvation; we do pray for mercy.
> And that same prayer doth teach us all
> To render the deeds of mercy."

It is not superfluous to add that strong convictions or narrow beliefs do not interfere with the practice of judging others gently and in love, but rather foster it. All those whom the law of life has made severe on themselves seem correspondingly indulgent for the mistakes of others. On the other hand, persons who will not take their stand upon principle and belief to reject emphatically the false because they know the true, often will judge persons harshly and in unloving manner, for they themselves never have been subjected to the discipline of any specific principle or belief.

Biblical Authority is our sufficient source for belief in eternal punishment, and we submit in conclusion to interested readers some Scriptural texts in proof of the doctrine of eternal condemnation of those who die impenitent.

In the Old Testament we find the following references: Deuteronomy XXXII, 22; Psalm IX, 17;

Proverbs XXIX, 1; Ezekiel, X, 31, 32; Daniel XI, 2.

In the New Testament: Matthew X, 28; XII, 32; XIII, 39, 42; XVI, 26, 27; XXIII, 33; XXV, 41; XXV, 46; XXVI, 24; Mark IX, 45, 46; XXI, 16; Luke XIII, 35; XIII, 23, 24; XIII, 27, 28; XVI, 19, 31; John III, 3; V, 28, 29; Acts XVII, 31; Romans II, 12, 16; 2 Corinthians V, 10; 2 Thessalonians I, 6-10; 2 Peter II, 4-9; Jude 7; Revelation XX, 12, 13; XXI, 8; XXII, 10-13.

It should be observed that *life* and *death* have in New Testament Greek more content than in classic Greek. *Life* means not only conscious being, but an eternal enjoyment of God; and death not merely cessation of existence, but rather eternal separation from God.

While still continuing to believe in the tenet of punishment as in the whole of the orthodox gospel, may we by the grace of God adorn the traditional doctrine of the Christian Church. For with all stress on doctrine, and just because of it, we most rigidly enjoin the application of that fair test of our Master as to true discipleship: "By their fruits ye shall know them."

IS "PROVERBS" UTILITARIAN?

IT is a difficult affair to dissociate one's self from one's deep-lying convictions, even in the attempt to be entirely impartial. In a search for truth, nothing may be sacred but the truth; yet the content and nature of truth must be received necessarily through the inquiring agent. The "personal equation" enters as an important factor into the grouping and relating of the facts of our observation. I therefore will admit frankly that while putting the question the answer already is determined for me. The idea is conceivable that God should in his own Word—the perfect rule of faith and practice—present his ethical commands on a basis of exchange for human merit. In that sense we would have a kind of bartering morality resulting from God's inducement to good action, supposing that man is capable of good action, and that the good action still remains such, when determined from the hope of reward anticipated in the doing. However, the absolute authority of the command would be endangered when service was bought by the promise of favor.

The Jewish law assumed subsequently in its legalistic constructions a most marked utilitarian aspect. The Pharisees understanding of a good living enters into this idea of a good life. They would not seriously strive to be good, unless this was advantageous to them. God's commands are conditioned by the demands of those to whom they are addressed. But the Sovereign God who created all things unto himself, the God of mercy and of absolute holiness, as a matter of fact, disappears in the face of such interpretation.

Our inquiry, therefore, resolves itself into the consideration of the passages and seeming tenor of the book

which would tend to create the impression that the book of Proverbs is utilitarian in its ethics. We would fain show that the Utilitarian school finds no authority in the Bible. There is no appeal to the "prudential motives," only a seeming appeal to the utility of the good. We therefore do not take the book of Proverbs as an ordinary collection of epigrammatic wisdom, subject it to a close survey as to its moral flavor, and then conclude what from the first is uppermost in the estimate, and determines the procedure, namely, that it is free from utilitarian ethics, in spite of seeming indications of expediency. The Bible having still authority for us, we turn to it for instruction and for correction, not to correct and rectify. But we would know, and so try to explain. This is our aim in this article.

There is a very fine work on the *Proverbs* by one of the many spiritual divines of Scotland. It does not especially bear on our subject, since it is a sort of running homily on the different texts of the book. Its title, however, is suggestive. It is, *Laws from Heaven for Life on Earth,* by William Arnot. This title furnishes us with the key to the seeming discrepancies from divine commands in the repeated references made to reward and punishment as considerations for good and evil conduct. The Christian system is often likewise laid along the surface of common life, without removing it thereby from its foundations in the doctrine of grace. The authority of the instructions is divine, though the form is transparently human. As one Divine Spirit inspires, so there is unity in the whole, however varied the details of God's word. Indeed, we assume the same unity in this world. We must therefore reasonably proceed on the same basis in the Bible, even if apparent contradictions appear which seem to defy explanation. Human reason is only true

to its nature when it confides in the infinite, limitless reason of its source, and suspends judgment in regard to unsolvable mysteries.

At the beginning of our discussion, we direct attention to the appeal which guards against utilitarianism. Proverbs I, 7 says, "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge: but fools despise wisdom and instruction." The royal preacher founds knowledge and wisdom in the fear of the Lord. The appeal is not to the consideration of self, which hedonistic, utilitarian, or worldly prudential and rational respectability is bound to take. No: the emphatic declaration right at the beginning of the sermon of counsels is, wherever you are under the fear of the Lord, you are under the right guidance. Not consideration of utility, but fear of God Almighty, is the appeal, motive, and wisdom of Solomon's counsels.

There is also the evident fact from the statements in the Nineteenth Psalm, that "the law of the Lord is perfect, converting the soul:" that "the fear of the Lord is clean;" whereas "the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether;" they are more to be desired than gold, they are sweet; but, "moreover, by them is thy servant warned." These texts contain the two facts which we find in the book of Proverbs side by side. The judgments of the Lord are true. It is a comforting conviction, sweet indeed, that God, even God, holds the balances of this world as a judge. He is righteous altogether, his laws operate in perfect wisdom and justice. If the transgressor will only see, he must find that his way is hard because it is not God's way. It is written in the very essence of this world that evil runs out, before long it must fail. In a modern phrase of American life, one might say, "It does not pay" to discard God's commands. It is poor

policy: only "fools despise wisdom and instruction."

Reading life's experiences in most sober fashion, we see that evil will not stand. The mills of the gods grind slowly, but exceedingly small. Since God is on the throne, there must be retributive and punitive justice. And this is no idea of a judgment *ab extra,* in judge-like fashion, after it is all over with sinning and blundering. Nay, sin inevitably and intrinsically stores up the wrath of God; for he presides over this very world-order, and its laws work his sovereign will. Therefore "by them is thy servant warned." If we but want to observe, we may see the workings of God's law, and our souls may be converted. Even in the face of overwhelming adversity, if but observing and obeying God's commands, the potent declarations of the Twenty-Third Psalm sound in our ears: "Yea though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil: for thou art with me; thy rod and thy staff they comfort me."

With the acknowledgment, then, of these two well-known facts,—namely, that virtue will be rewarded, and that vice is distintegrating, entailing disaster,—we have the problem clearly before us. We perceive at once that the crux of the problem lies in the connection of these facts with our behavior as moral motives. The human consideration of ethical life too aptly brings in the dependence of our doing good upon the rewards which are to follow; and, likewise, the avoidance of evil, only because it spells ruin to the evil-doer. Only, in the second place, it is remembered that God regulates it so, because he wants us to do the expedient and right thing. Our limited, finite wisdom and insight blunderingly finds out the right way.

We find throughout the Bible the alternatives between good and evil conduct contrasted. It is the in-

evitable reaction of the constitution of the world upon the ways of behavior. Men have at all times reflected on these issues. Even our blessed Saviour concludes the Sermon on the Mount with the parable of the building by a foolish man, as contrasted with the building by a wise man. Had He utilitarian motives,—He, who was a man of sorrows, faithful unto death?

The Proverbs take a practical turn, they move in the social sphere; and, in consequence of this, they deal specifically with the doings between man and man. Because of this application to the concrete living of everyday life in this world, they lay stress on the social side. But that sufficient stress is laid on the motive is evident in the affirmation, "Keep thy heart with all diligence." The instruction makes much of the negative aspect of right living in emphasizing constantly the disastrous consequences and folly of wrong-doing and sin, which are contrasted continually with the good results of righteous living. This is the practical aspect, the convincing method of approach. As, indeed, we start so naturally our warning to an erring brother: "My dear friend, this will not do. This will go to crash in the end;" yet the final appeal is to the justice of a governing God, overruling human relations and affairs. So the doctrine of rewards comes in, but Proverbs insists on the justice of God, and so lays the foundation for his love. The right, then, is not interchangeable with the expedient, though the right will prove ultimately the expedient, because it is a just God who executes justice. Proverbs, therefore, present an objective and absolute system of ethics.

Indeed, the thought of *Revelation* would imply both these characteristics. Right is right, however disadvantageously it may issue. You are not to judge according to your views of expediency, for in particular cases

you cannot establish the expediency at all. Rather, we are to believe, that, since it is so on the whole, the right must be expedient in the end, even in particular; because God orders right, and a just God will vindicate his commands as beneficient to the observing agent. In the end you therefore rely on God's will. This final appeal to God's sovereign will, which makes the ethics objective, puts them also beyond the reach of utilitarianism. The motive is no more utility, but God's will. If the will of God is the rule of morality, then any amount of resort to a doctrine of temporal rewards does not endanger the ethical nature of the Proverbial ethics, since it does not end in these prudential motives.

Malan, in *Notes on the Proverbs,* collects numerous parallels from the wisdom literature of other religions; and that goes to show that the appeal is a very natural and practical one. In fact, one may well find occasion to admire the deep insight which is exhibited into the practical nature of ethical behavior, without endangering the high motive which must always be reserved for any true morality. This emphasis we find in Proverbs IV, 23: "Keep thy heart with all diligence; for out of it are all the issues of life." The heart must be applied to wisdom, (III, 4): mercy and truth must be bound about the neck; yea, written upon the table of the heart: "Trust in the Lord with all thine heart." Here is evidently no appeal to things without. The prudential motive of utilitarian ethics has quite another ring.

As W. S. Bruce remarks truly in *The Ethics of the Old Testament,* "The ethics of the Old Testament cannot be charged with eudæmonism, nor with filling out the conceptions of moral good by means of utilities alone. It does allow room for these utilitarian values, but the external blessings are of worth only when they

are conjoined with the higher blessings of God's favor and presence." But it is to be borne in mind above all things, that the "ways of man are before the eyes of the Lord, and he weigheth carefully all his paths." And in the enumeration of six evil things reference is made to the Lord: "There be six things which the Lord hateth" (VI, 16). In VIII, 13 it is said, again, that "the fear of the Lord is to hate evil;" ver. 36: "He that sinneth against me wrongeth his own soul: all they that hate me love death." The constant and predominant reference to the Lord shows that, indeed, "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, and the knowledge of the Holy One is understanding." We find these references throughout the book: X, 3, 22, 24, 27; XI, 1, 4, 20; XII, 22; XIV, 27; XV, 3, 16; XVI, 11; XX, 12, 33; XXI, 1, 2, etc.

These references prove the beautiful statement of Professor Bruce: "In the Old Testament people did not dream of making themselves the judges of virtue. The foundation of virtue was not laid in any study of man's moral nature and capacities [significant in its bearing on the concreteness of Jewish ethics]. But in the ethical conception of God, whose character and will had been made known to them, both in words and deeds of grace, they found the one grand and positive principle of all moral life. It was owing to this cause that Hebrew ethics never fell into powerless empiricism, or a dreamy, unpractical philosophy of virtue." God speaks, and man must obey. The will of Jehovah is the one ethically good thing for Israel, for it is the will of the covenant God, who has chosen them to be the people of his own possession.

In Dr. Oort's *"Kommentaar op de Spreuken,"* we see how even radical theologians admit that expediency as a motive is not to be allowed in the wisdom of one

who has inclined his ear unto these teachings. In his discussion of the moral standpoint of the writer of Proverbs, Oort says: "That the prophet, the priest, and the wise man of antiquity became gradually supplanted by the scribal legalist has been the moral death to Judaism." Oort wants to see these reflections in the book of Proverbs, as these new-school *zeit-geschichtliche* Bible exegetes want to find, on *a priori* grounds, the time-spirit reflected even in the Bible. This we may admit in a negative way; not, however, in a positive way, as this would bring the Bible teaching within time conditions, a product of the wisdom of the ages, of man.

He argues that the writer uses no doubt rather low incentives to stimulate men to virtue, but we have shown that this is not the ethical appeal of Proverbs. It is rather the argument from the standpoint of the one to whom it is addressed. Oort admits, however, that the way of life is found in the fear of the Lord and true wisdom—such as results from the application of the heart (compare II, 19; III, 22; IV, 22, 23; V, 6; VI, 23; VIII, 35; IX, 6, etc.); whilst the ways of sin and folly lead to death (compare II, 18; V, 5; VIII, 36; IX, 18). The punishment of sinners consists in poverty and shame (compare III, 35; IV, 19; VI, 33) and total destruction (I, 26; II, 22; V, 23).

Yet he concludes his discussion of the Proverbs by saying that the author was not a sober, rational man, who, after coolly considering the pros and cons of the way of sin and of virtue, then presented his conclusions as in favor of the good. Our Bible-critic overthrows his assumptions by adding: "From the glow wherewith the writer gives his exhortations it is at once evident that he had not given himself to the consideration that righteousness and the fear of the Lord as such mean

great blessings as contrasted with the miserable life of sin. In the time of Proverbs, Judaism had not arrived at its rabbinical corruptions. The author is a kindly dispositioned man of the law." In conclusion, Oort even states that the two fatal results of rabbinical legalism—formality and eudæmonism—were not at all to be found in these teachings in a direct way. Proverbs not merely holds the wisdom of ethics, but also employs the earnest reproof of loving exhortations (see I, 23, 24, 30; VI, 23; XXIX, 1, etc.).

The Old Testament knows of no abstract ethics. It does not contain a system of ethics spun out after a logical method, such as our modern times produce in their argued codes of morals. Old Testament ethics enters into life in a very definite and concrete manner: it is in constant touch with actual life. Is it, therefore, not to be expected, as a matter of course, that its wisdom should include words of reproof and references to the blessings of a virtuous life?

It is a terrible thing to see how life's experiences are lost upon the majority of men. Though they have lived, as the phrase runs, the folly is still upon them, as is the awful habit of vice—in the midst of the ruin they have wrought to themselves and others. Of this fact *Proverbs* takes particular notice, and the urgent appeal to stand in the fear of the Lord is reinforced by the assurance that God is on the throne; that he holds the balances is only too evident.

Out of life's experiences may be gathered a wisdom unto life eternal. Therefore we should apply our hearts to wisdom. Evidences show us that no one less than God awaits our decision, and that an inevitable judgment attends our conduct. This circumstance certainly was not to be left out in a concrete, direct appeal to the doings of men, and in no way introduces eudæ-

monism in the Bible code, which is typically characterized by the *thou shalt* of old. The corresponding subjective, *I ought,* to be sure was worked out in the legalism of Pharisaic contrivance after a utilitarian fashion. But this is outside of the Scripture canon in the Haggadai of the Scribes.

In conclusion, the opinions of a Roman Catholic Bible exegete, Dr. Elster, of the monastery Loccum, concur in recognizing in *Proverbs* the universally exalted view, which the Old Testament, though in incomplete form, teaches as much as the New,—namely, that "with God is the fountain of life."

"Wenn wir den eightenthümlichen Begriff 'Leben,' wie er im Buch der Proverbien hervortritt, und seine Kerhrseite den 'Tod' genauer ins Auge fassen, so ergiebt sich leicht, dass diese Begriffe prägnanter Art sind, dass 'Leben' hier ein Sein bezeichnet, dass sich darin als ein wahrhaftes erweist, dass es nie zerstört werden kann, wie umgekehrt der 'Tod' in unserem Buche nicht etwa einen Wechsel der 'Erscheinungsform,' sondern eine wesentliche Auflösung und Vernichtung bezeichnet 'Leben' bezeichnet in den Sprüchen das menschliche Dasein, insofern dasselbe sich zu seinem wahren Ziel vollendet, insofern das Individuum sich zu einer ethischen Gestalt von ewiger Bedeutung entwickelt hat." "In the way of righteousness is life" (XII, 28), "the righteous hath hope in his death" (XIV, 32). Is all this not in perfect accord with the saying of the Master, "I came that they may have life, and have it abundantly?" And is it not the wisdom unto life eternal to apply our hearts to this truth, even the truth as it is in Jesus?

ANENT MIGHT AND RIGHT

IT is not amiss to engage theological interest in the discussion of might and right. Especially since the great war began, journalistic ignorance has indulged freely in the popular fallacy while it treats the conceptions of might and right as wholly unrelated, or even opposing. As a matter of fact while might contends with its brute force on the battlefields, the respective governments employing it, appeal to the sentiment of right to enforce their cause; all assume that they are trying to defend the right by might. Where was ever a struggle, where was ever might employed in an issue, that this might was not claimed to be in the service of right? Might is but an ancillary of the right. Thus the supreme governor of the universe, God Almighty, has willed it. Thus might is always and forever in the end in the service of ultimate right.

Thus biologist and physicist exclaim with wonderment about the infinite power over detail disclosed in the study of nature. "Nothing walks with aimless feet." In large and in small things alike the world is controlled by the will of God, if a God does control the issues of the world. We must keep on believing that God is on the throne, that not a sparrow falls to the ground without God's will, that He feeds the smallest creature, and clothes the lily in beautiful array, as well as the grass that to-day is and to-morrow is cast into the oven.

Why should we be dismayed at the sight of seeming disorder, when we believe that God is in all and over all? Why despair of Christianity and the world's progress when we know that God rules the world. "God's in his heaven, all's right with the world."

Might never can destroy the right. The right is guaranteed by God's existence. If—as Kant conceived it—religion and theology rest on the ethical autonomic will of man, then we may indeed despair at the sight of such a terrible conflict as the world witnesses to-day. But as long as we feel that the right issues from God who is the creator and judge of the world, we may affirm confidently: "All things work together for good to those that love God."

The phrases *might over right,* or *right above might* resolve themselves simply into saying that evil rules good, or that good controls evil. Might and right are not terms to be opposed to one another. Might indicates power, and as such is innocent of moral quality —unless as it serves evil or good intent and purpose— it is not necessarily immoral. Might rather denotes an unmoral force, which might be directed either by good or by evil. Right, however, always and everywhere means the moral attribute which refers back to the God of righteousness, supreme over the universe. Of course the patent fact remains that evil is actual in the world, and manifests its power over man. To discount this fact or to belittle the significance of evil is not to get rid of it. There is no theodicy which can solve this insoluble problem. The world's greatest problem is sin. But the Gospel proclaims that the solution of all the world's troubles is Christ. Scripture holds the comforting assurance that "as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous." (Romans 5:19). Thus we may feel that "where sin abounded, grace did much more abound." Evil is not triumphant, and the world's sin and darkness must yield to "the true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world." Earth then has no ills that Heaven cannot

cure. We affirm the supremacy of good over evil with confident assurance, not making light of evil by whatever ingenious devices of the modern interpretations, but believing in God as the moral ruler of the universe.

Sin is not a "misapplied desire," "an unfortunate ignorance," "pitiable weakness incident to human nature, or even an undeveloped good," as Sudermann proclaims it in *Magda*. "And one thing more, my friend, —sin! We must sin if we wish to grow. To become greater than our sins is worth more than all the purity you preach!" "A sin—as the Bible teaches—bears an ethical character, it is a wilful defiance of, and a deliberate disobedience to God. It is forever the taint of will, the original sin which makes man do the things he ought not to do, and leave undone the things he ought to do. We are incapable of any good, because there is no health in us. Our will is at variance with God's will, ἔχθρα εἰς Θεόν." "For if our heart condemns us, God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things." (1 John 3:20).

We therefore are fully aware of the reality of evil, its insidious power, its destructive ravages, but when we survey the world and its doings with the eyes of faith, we discern even where least apparent, in and over the things of time, the eternal purpose of God, who sees the end from the beginning. The structure of the world is essentially moral, because God made it. "I believe in God the Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth." Therefore we may repeat with the prophet Amos: "Shall evil befall a city, and the Lord hath not done it?"

What a tremendous assumption rationalistic schemes make in every theodicy! These defenses of God's existence, aiming at proofs of His existence, mostly over-

reach themselves. More fitting is to-day the affirmation and maintenance of the Gospel as once delivered to the saints. Apologetics often becomes an impertinence, and its evidences are sadly unevidencing. We need less of argument in favor of a divine government of the world, and ever more faith in God's overruling power. Faith too is reason, reason on the most rational of all grounds, divine testimony. We give a reason for the faith that is in us, and the assent of faith is followed by the assent of reason. As Anselm said: *"Negligente mihi videtur, si postquam confirmati sumus in fide, non studemus quod credimus intelligere."* In his famous dictum *"Credo ut intelligam,"* the *ut intelligam* is recognized with the *credo* as a necessity of human nature. He also implies this in his saying *"fides quaerit intellectum."* This reasonable faith must be exercised in the query whether the world's forces make for evil or for good, for this is really what people mean when they say that might makes right or that right is might. You will find what you are looking for. If you set out in quest of the world's weeds, you must not expect to bring back its flowers. It is only because they are at heart of materialistic conviction, that people so often assert that might is right. Their conception of right is so abstract, theoretic, visionary, that it is indeed *diablement idéal*. Their ideals are merely held to perch upon in dreamy contemplation, high above the sordid actuality of this world and its dreadful doings, and always apart from it.

Nay, but this world as it is, is God's world, and He rules over it, and in it, in spite of all the evil you may perceive. Truth and right, therefore, are not detached, visionary things, but living principles at work in this very world, and controlling it. The right has a foothold here and fights its way to final victory. Many

people stare themselves blind upon the mere mechanism, the outward forms, the means, the actual that is to be moulded and transformed into the ideal, they lose sight of the spiritual. Lotze well observed, however, that though the range of mechanism in this world is large, its importance and significance is entirely subordinate and secondary. This world, therefore, is not a prison house, and man is not the sport of blind brute forces. God is sovereign! There is a subtle power overruling the world's struggles, and faith perceives that, even when least apparent, God is the most real of powers. The arm of flesh fails where God's mighty arm is bared. The sceptical sarcasm of the phrase: "God is on the side of the strongest battalions!" is refuted by Paul's classic utterance to the Corinthians: "God hath chosen the weak things of the world to confound the things which are mighty. And base things of the world, and things which are despised, hath God chosen, yea, and things which are not, to bring to naught the things that are." (1 Cor. 1:27, 28).

The Bible affirms throughout that God exercises His infinite care in the minutest details over the works of His hands. It is constantly declared that everything proclaims His glory and wisdom, while it also is said repeatedly that mere worldly power and human strength will not endure. "Oh ye of little faith," it says, put therefore your trust in God. The prophets appeal to God for deliverance out of trouble. They proclaim Him a very present help. He is the refuge of old, the strength and habitation of all tried people. "Through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear." (Hebrews 11:3). The opening of John's gospel announces the Christian philosophy: "In the beginning was the

Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him: and without him was not anything made that was made." (John 1:1-4). As Lactantius said: *"Christianus verus philosophus"* and *"Verus philosophus amator Dei."* For the true philosopher discerns that all things are from God, by God, and unto God. The whole universe thus reveals God's wisdom as the world existed first in God. "For in Him we live and move and have our being." God thought this world, before He created it. *Kosmische Vernunft* alone can explain this world order. Even matter has its origin in God, and is subject to divine will and purpose. Thomas Aquinas affirms therefore even of matter: *"Materia, licet recedat a Dei similitudine secundum suam potentialitatem tamen inquantum vel sic esse habet, similitudinem quendam retinet divini esse."* Divine wisdom then thought and planned this world, God's thought gives reality to all things, and as His will operates in this world, how can we reasonably doubt that things will plan out, as the Creator purposed? For God is not only transcendent over all things; he is also immanent in all things. Hence immanent teleology, *Zielstrebigkeit,* corresponds to transcendent teleology, *Zweckmässigkeit.* All things are not only planned by God, but take on and realize the *causa finalis.* Thus to Christian philosophy, the whole world becomes one organic whole, born of one thought, led by one will, meant for one purpose. All things are from God, by God and unto God! Professor Bavinck observes: "The whole world is ὀργανον, which is also μηχανη; and a μηχανῆ which at the same time is ὀργανον; it is a building that grows and a body that is being built; a work of art of the supreme Artist and builder of the Universe." (*"Christelyke wereld-*

beschouwing").

The causa finalis makes all *causae efficientes,* whether they be mechanical or organic, physical or psychic forces, subservient to the realization of God's glory. Divine energy shapes the world's course, and conducts it to its end. Sin does not frustrate God's power, it only reveals it in greater splendor when the world-plan is continued in a plan of salvation. In the face of the seeming chaos and lapses of civilization in history, the world moves forward to the coming of Christ and of God's kingdom. God carries out his plan, and according to his promises we may expect a new Heaven and a new earth wherein righteousness dwells forever. Schiller's *"Worte des Glaubens"* are a beautiful poetic rendering of this faith:

"Und ein Gott ist, ein heiliger Wille lebt,
Wie auch der menschliche wanke;
Hoch über der Zeit und dem Raume webt
Lebendig der höchste Gedanke
Und ob alles im ewigem Wechsel kreist,
Es beharret im Wechsel ein ruhiger Geist."

Though in the physical world of nature a rigid causality rules everywhere, materialism cannot extend the method of physical sciences very far in explanation of this world and its course. Not a blade of grass growing in the field can be explained thus. The problem of life is as puzzling as ever. Even Häckel admits that life is not the result of organization, but vice versa. Life exists, before it weaves its organism into its service, which organism is made for its function, rather than determined by it. The *Eigengestaltsamkeit* will not reveal its secret to the most insistent and minutest scrutiny. Of these fundamental queries it may still

be said: *"Omnia exeunt in mysterio."* Our theories explain too much or too little.

Matthew Arnold who proclaims the natural victoriousness of right under the laws of the Universe, lapses back into a soulless, mechanical world, when he makes the superficial remark against the argument of design, that he has no experience in world-building. "We know from experience that men make watches, and bees make honeycombs. We do not know from experience that a Creator of all things makes ears and buds." (*God and the Bible*, pp. 102-103). How can Arnold affirm the world's teleology on such grounds? He should stand rather with Goethe's view of nature:

"Denn unfühlend
Ist die Natur:
Est leuchtet die Sonne
Uber Bös' und Gute,
Und dem Verbrecher
Glänzen, wie dem Besten,
Der Mond und die Sterne."

Goethe implies that nature's behavior is that of a cruelly indifferent, soulless mechanism, and loses sight of God as ruler of nature. Christ, observing the very same fact, proclaims: "He maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust." (Matthew 5:45). What different interpretations the same laws of nature, the world's operating forces admit, when viewed by the eye of faith, or when faith has been surrendered to the desire for demonstration. The contrast here is striking indeed and it confirms again that pantheism is really after all but "painted atheism." Goethe viewed nature as a living entity, instinct with life, intelligence, move-

ment, energy. Nature of natural law is again written large and called God. He calls nature the living garment of God (*der Gottheit lebendiges Kleid*), but leaves God out. Pantheistic are his well-known words:

"Was wär' ein Gott der nur von aussen stiesse,
Im Kreis das All am Finger laufen liesse?
Ihm ziemt 's die Welt im Innern zu bewegen
Natur in sich, sich in Natur zu hegen,
So das was in ihm lebt, und webt, und ist
Nie seine Kraft, nie seinen Geist vermisst."

also his lines:

"Wie Natur im Vielgebilde
Einen Gott nur offenbart
So im weitern Kunstgefilde
Webt ein Sinn der ew'gen Art."

But such pantheism yields after all only, as quoted above; *"Denn unfühlend ist die Natur."*
and

"Die Ros' ist ohn Warumb
Sie blühet weil sie blühet."

God is not a reality, he is a make-belief; in Goethe's own words, God is nothing but—as the modernist now holds—a reflection of individual character.

"Wie einer ist, so ist sein Gott,
Darum wird Gott sooft zu Spott.
Im Innern ist ein Universum auch
Daher der Völker löblicher Gebrauch,
Dass jeglicher das Beste, was er kennt
Er Gott, ja seinen Gott benennt,
Ihm Himmel und Erden übergiebt
Ihm fürcht und womöglich liebt,"

Hence this panoramic ability made religion wholly a subjective affair, a *religion de moi, eine Art Weltanschauung.* Characteristic are his words:

> *"In uns'res Busens reine wogt ein Streben*
> *Sich einen Höhern, Reinern, Unbekannten*
> *Aus Dankbarkeit fpeiwllig hinzugeben,*
> *Enträtselnd sich den ewig Ungepannten*
> *Wir heissen's fromm sein."*

The great poet stores up rich materials for the modern theories which reduce religion to emotional evaluation, and which divide our judgments into judgments of existence which are scientific, and judgments of value which are religious. (Seinurteile und Werturteile). His faith, he states in his own words, as "a kind of sacred vessel into which he poured his emotion, his understanding and his imagination." Hence he could say:

> *"Wer Wissenschaft hat und Kunst*
> *Der hat auch Religion.*
> *Und wer sie nicht hat,*
> *Der habe Religion."*

Emerson, who was fed to the full upon Goethe, and read every line of Goethe's works, transfused this vapory religiosity into the New England Puritan thought, where it broke out in New England transcendentalism, which allows large scope to the claims of subjectivism in the domain of religion, while elevating nature and its laws into God.

But God is a God of nature as well as of the ethical law. The same infinite wisdom which thought this world before its creation, gave reality to the world of

things and truth to our minds, gave us also the *norma* of knowledge, will, and action. The same God is author of the logical, the ethical, and the aesthetic laws, and they cannot therefore be at variance one with another. One sovereign God gives reality to all things, content to our consciousness, and norma for our action. The *ideae* in the divine consciousness, the *formae* which constitute the essence of things, and the *normae,* which are set us as the rule of life, are mutually in close relation because logic, physics, and ethics issue from the same meta-physical source. The objectivity of these logical, ethical, and aesthetical *normae* points clearly to a world-order which has its origin and maintenance in God Almighty. Human trust in these *normae* is faith in God's existence. Similarly are "the roots of a right evaluation of historic events and temporal life only to be found in Christianity," as Eucken remarks, *"So liegen die Wurzeln einer höhern Schätzung der Geschichte und des zeitlichen Lebens nirgends anders als im Christentum."* (*"Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart,"* p. 190).

God is not proved by man, but He ever proves himself to man. If he so proves himself to man, why should he need to be proved? "The fool sayeth in his heart there is no God." Faith in the principles of logic, ethics, and aesthetics presupposes religion and thereby rests upon faith in the existence of God. With all the ingenuity of modern systems, God is not banished from this world. Neither in theory nor in practice can you be good without God. Neither in whole nor in part can you explain this world's course without God. You cannot banish God from human consciousness. If you make your bed in the grave God is there. *"Geist regiert die Welt."* "God is a Spirit and those that worship Him, should worship Him in spirit and in

truth."

Materialistic interpretations of the world, of history, and of economics are diametrically opposed to this view. Karl Marx plainly states this in the preface to his *"Kritik der politischen Okonomie": "Es ist nicht das Bewustsein des Menschen, das ihr Sein, sondern umgekehrt ihr gesellschaftliches Sein, das ihr Bewustsein bestimmt."* (It is not human consciousness which determines social being, but the other way about, social being which determines the consciousness of man).

Such an acceptance of the actual as final is to discard all aspirations towards ideal ends, it is to fail hopelessly even in the actual. Truly, "where there is no vision the people perish." (Proverbs 29:18). This fact is patently manifested in ethical studies, because a normative science implies the supernatural as authoritative standard over this world. The attempt to view the ideal as a product and result of the actual which it is to control, never has proved satisfactory. It is within this very world that the ideal is shaping the natural. And to recognize in the things seen that they are created and ruled by things unseen is the function of the eye of faith. Thus those who find the right and its guarantee in the nature of God rely upon Him who sees the end from the beginning to conduct the world's course. The man of faith voices as a profound conviction: "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" Thus the tried and troubled Job answered: "Of a truth I know that it is so" when Bildad the Shuhite says: "Behold, God will not cast away a perfect man, neither will he uphold the evildoers." It all goes to show that only faith solves this problem. In and over this world, God's infinite power and wisdom rule, and He will justify His ways in the end.

"Blind unbelief is sure to err,
And scans His works in vain
God is His own interpreter
And He will make it plain."

The true meaning of things, their justification is not revealed in the temporal sphere, in the actual. "Who by searching can find out God?" The disclosure of the meaning of the world's course is to be found in its Creator, but apprehended by faith:

"Who loved, who suffered countless ills
Who battled for the True, the Just
Be blown about the desert dust,
Or sealed within the iron hills?
* * * * *

O life as futile, then, as frail!
O for thy voice to soothe and bless!
What hope of answer or redress?
Behind the veil, behind the veil."

By faith we lay hold upon this ultimate rationality of the world, and its regulative principles as correctives in experience. Faith, the indispensable element involved in every act of human life, is in Christian life able to subdue the world in active initiative for Him, who is its author and finisher. All ethics but corroborate this theistic position by the assumption that the ideal right of the individual coincides with that of humanity. In Christ, "ruler of all nature, of God and man the Son" this is not an assumption, but becomes a reality; we know the Truth as it is in Jesus. Lincoln said well: "Let us have faith that right is might." History everywhere refutes the idea that force as such ever can defeat the right. Rectitude of will is stronger than the will for power. (*"Wille zur Macht"*).

"Thrice is he armed who has his quarrel just,
And he but naked though looked up in steel
Whose conscience with injustice is corrupted."

It is always the right which is essentially mighty, while might is in the main employed in behalf of the right. Even Mephistopheles is made to proclaim himself:

"Ein Teil von jener Kraft,
.Die stets das Böse will und stets das Gute schafft."

All the forces of the world are appropriated, rendered available to function for moral ends, till all things, all power, shall actually have been given unto the King of kings and Lord of lords. Hence all enduring power in this world has approved itself from mere might to be righteous might, to be right clothed with power. from *de facto* to *de jure;* from power as a matter of fact as might to one which is recognized and approved to exist by right, as right. In this sense the Scripture says: "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers: for there is no power but of God. The powers that he, are ordained by God." It presupposes that the established powers are in accord with the highest powers.

The right of revolution by the people against established power and authority is a moot question. Calvinistic Holland revolted against Philip II of Spain, the Puritan colonies of America resisted the tyrannies of George III, Cromwell took the head of the head of England. Dr. Kuyper, leader of the Calvinists, practically concedes in *"Nadere Toelichting"* the right of revolution under provocation, provided it be not undertaken individually. Still it stands with the authority of Scripture:

"By me kings reign,
And princes decree justice
By me princes rule
And nobles even all judges of the earth."
(Proverbs VIII, 15, 16).

Let it be observed that the Dutch declared that Philip was no more their rightful king, the colonists denied George's right over them, and Cromwell that of the Stuart kings. There is a divine right only to rule, not to misrule. "For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil." Governments are but articulate expression, formulated, tested expression of the right. They are self-propagating only as inhering in ultimate truth and right. They possess this only as efficient codification and human agency to be "the minister of God." "The consent of the governed" is based again on the principles for which the creator purposed the people to live in society; "the consent of the people" is not the ultimate source, but God. He ordained governments as a restraint upon the ravages of sin, "a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil." Everything in this world which wields power has to be accredited to moral right if it is to be lasting. Right, on the other hand is no more an abstract and detached principle than the world powers are an indifferent force.

"Man needs must fight
To make true peace his own
He needs must combat might with might
Or might would rule alone."

"History is the battleground of standards of values" says Höffding; but profounder is the old German say-

ing *"Die Weltgeschicht' ist das Weltgericht."* (The world's history is the world's judgment). Both statements, however, point to the fact that in the world-process and its history, right and judgment inhere to approve and to disapprove. Indeed it is a singularly crude notion that mere power, unmoral force ever should be able to function in vindication, in establishing, or gaining victory for the right where its activities are not called forth and sustained by right. You neither can stay right and truth by mere force, nor advance it thereby. Might viewed as power, force, neither will retard nor advance civilization one whit.

But with everyone rests individually this responsibility to call the means into service of the end, to shape the world through himself into the likeness of its Creator and Judge. God rules this world after all. The outlook may not be reassuring, but Christianity has an invincible ignorance of defeat. "Truth crushed to earth will rise again!" We must not stare ourselves purblind on processes, and means, on might; our first concern is with the right. Lincoln's assertion to his friends has point here. It is not the question whether God is on our side, but whether we are on God's side. All instrumentalism, all leanings on forms, on efforts in furtherance of moral strength seem futile when these forces are not borne onward and forward by God. The sovereign God is not bound by the work of His hands, and where He himself does not initiate and operate a movement man may propose, but God disposes. Business methods may of course, be employed rightly in religious and moral endeavors, but they remain mere means, and ever should be considered so.

Mr. Mott cannot cover the world's evangelization in a mechanical way by dividing the missionary field and calling for corresponding volunteers. Not a single

man can be forced into the Kingdom by all the revivals, ritualism, ceremonialism, or other human devices in behalf of the Gospel, any more than educational methods by themselves can produce intellectual results.

> "The king can make a belted knight
> But an honest man's aboon his might
> A man's a man for a'that."

We should bear in mind Paul's words: "I have planted, Apollos watered; but God gave the increase." (1 *Cor.* 3:6). Only the right is might to the end, and the right issues from God. The kingdom is not taken by violence. Might must in God's dispensation wait upon right. The race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong. *Dieu joue aux surprises!* The first are last, and the last, first. Seeming ascendency often spells doom. There are reversals in history. The busts of Roman Emperors were replaced upon their columns by the statues of humble fishermen! You cannot and should not rely on mere means, or judge by outward appearances.

When Christ died upon the Cross his words: "It is finished" spelled victory. The supreme sacrifice had been accomplished. Henceforth the sign of the cross may indeed be taken as the symbol of the sins of men crucifying the righteous one and thinking "It is finished" meant the end of Christ and his cause. But the cross becomes rather to subsequent ages the symbol of Christ's victory over the sins of the world. Even the pagans felt that in this sign they should conquer.

Thus Professor Seeberg truly observes: *"An nichts empfindet man das Göttliche in Christo so tief, wie an diesem Sieg im Unterliegen."*

SOCIAL OR INDIVIDUAL REGENERATION?

BERNARD SHAW recently declared: "Christ is a failure, and God has been kicked out of the back-window in our modern age." This blasphemous utterance was designed to startle the audience, and perhaps did so. It has become quite plain, however, in recent ministerial conferences, that the prevailing sentiment among the younger ministers tends to think of the ministry as exclusively a call to social service. We need to-day a social gospel. The ministry of the Word must be supplanted by a ministry to human needs and life.

Whatever Christianity may have done in the past, it surely does not meet the needs of our present social conditions. Theology now must yield to sociology, even in parish and pulpit. Social democracy, Christian socialism if you will, is the workingman's religion, and is rapidly coming to be recognized as the only kind of religion worth having. It does things, it struggles for the right of one's fellow-men. It clothes the naked and feeds the hungry. The social gospel of to-day penetrates into all the activities of life. The Y. M. C. A.'s, the social settlements, clubs, and philanthropic enterprises of all sorts figure as prominently as the church, and maintain the standing of the church.

Preaching and teaching Christian truth is futile under the adverse conditions of congested centers; nay, the proclamation of the old gospel is out of place in the hard, sordid struggles of life as it is. Christianity does not save under such conditions; and so the modern minister has come to see that he must strike at those conditions. Improve conditions if you wish to improve society, for improved conditions will produce better

men. The pet word of evolutionary teachings, *environment,* has become the basis of the new philosophy, which is to displace—

"The old American Idee
To make a man a man, and let him be."

It matters little that evolutionary philosophers have affirmed subsequently that environment should not be employed as a leading factor in the much-vaunted modern *Weltanschauung.* The movement which social reformers built on it is beyond their control.

The declaration of the bankruptcy of Christianity, whether in the blasphemy of Bernard Shaw and his socialist companions, or in the more sinister facts of a socialized gospel, as many modern pastors seem to understand their calling, leaves us to work upon society through social endeavors. Thus, instead of christianizing society with the gospel of Christ, Christianity is to be socialized,—secularized, if you will. External efforts in the betterment of social conditions constitute the social gospel for to-day. That environment supplies really only the means for individual and social development, as the individual avails himself of the materials which the social *milieu* offers, or fails to do so, does not occur to the modern dogmatist. For these socialized modernists, the environment, the conditions, are basal facts; they hold the key to all improvement and are the leverage for economic and moral progress. Moral progress, in fact, is only a finer form of economic progress.

In stating the situation thus plainly we may facilitate the discussion at once of the principles underlying the spiritual interpretation of life, which raises the soul-concern as all-important, and of the view which sees

behind the individual the conditions, the environment, the social matrix, from which the individual emerges, with all his merits or demerits.

It is quite natural that the socialists, in their struggle for improved social conditions, should carry to its extreme the emphasis upon conditions as primary in life. It is less reasonable that ministers of the gospel should espouse this doctrine, and give their pulpits up to labor questions and social problems. Many of the younger clergymen schooled in seminaries that have been socialized in proportion to their detheologizing, have open-eyed accepted socialism as the modern gospel. Others harbor the hopeless illusion that Christianity and socialism go together, deceiving themselves with the superficial explanation that Christanity should manifest itself in social activities of good-will, and socialism should endeavor to establish civic righteousness in a Christian spirit.

What is there incompatible between the two standpoints? Why can one not be a Christian socialist? Simply, because the Christian believes, on the high authority of his Master, that "man shall not live by bread alone." While the socialist fights only for bread and butter, for better economic conditions. It is difficult to see how a fight for mere bread and butter properly can be called Christian. On the contrary, just in proportion as adhesion is given to the thoroughly materialistic doctrine of socialism, which diverts all interests from the individual soul on which Christianity primarily centers its attention, just on that proportion do we lose hold on Christianity.

The message and function of the church are spiritual. Sin, the fundamental problem of all ages, is to be overcome by the gracious indwelling of Christ in the hearts of regenerate humanity. Christianity aims at better

men, socialism at better conditions. They are, therefore, diametrically opposed to each other, both in motive and in spirit. It should not be necessary, but in order to avoid misinterpretation it may be observed that Christianity is of course never unmindful of conditions, but believes that they are created and controlled by man, and that they, as representing human achievement, may be instruments of success in human progress. Similarly, socialism is not indifferent to man, but believes that, as he is the creature of circumstances and controlled by his conditions, he will improve as external circumstances improve.

The criterion with the Christian is within man; for the socialist, the standard and source of human civilization is without. Now, to proclaim man the product and mere reflection of his social surroundings is to insult the moral sense of even the most depraved. The bold assumption which reduces human civilization to an epi-phenomenon of the natural, makes the social *milieu* not only a formative element in, but the producing cause of character, and by so doing dispenses with all morality and progress. There can be no struggle for the right when man is borne along on the tide as he happened to arrive upon the shores of time, fatally bound to the condition and the hour. And as to progress, it is hard to conceive of any, thus shut up in the mechanical circle of conditions without motive or standard.

It is time to raise an emphatic protest against socialism. It is death to the individual, conscience, and all progress. Instead of seeing conditions behind the individual, we see the individual in the midst of conditions. We see the individual struggle with these conditions, modify them, and replace them by others. We often see favorable conditions used for hurt, and bad conditions for good. Is there not a saying, "Give man

a paradise, and he will turn it into a desert, while he will strive to convert the desert into a garden?" Oscar Wilde voices in *De Profundis* the sad experience that, in common with many of his age, he had used the good things of life for his own harm, whilst he won good from the hard experiences of his life. In fact, it is a patent absurdity to maintain that a man's character is made or unmade mechanically by good or bad conditions. Can the most favorable circumstances ever guarantee a man's best development? Do bad conditions hopelessly doom to the production of bad characters? They may give color and form to the development, but never determine mechanically a man's moral flavor.

Man does not merely react passively upon these original, all-important conditions of society. He is responsible for them, he made them, he can change them. He is not the slave of them, be they good or bad. He is himself the main factor, he appropriates or rejects their material according to his nature. Selective thinking and the increasing emphasis which is placed on the volitional part of man's nature are meaningless jargon, if the socialist's contention be true. A good man faces bad conditions to grapple with them as often rises superior to them; a bad man in good external conditions works the quicker his own undoing. It is then, within man, not without, that his essential destiny is wrought out. It is wrought out by himself, not by conditions.

So far from conditions constructing human civilization, projecting it as it were into the individuals, Professor Perry says well: "The external environment of life is in some respects favorable, in other respects unfavorable. Now, strangely enough, it is the unfavorable rather than the favorable aspect of the environ-

ment that conduces to progress. Progress, or even the least good, would, of course, be impossible, unless the mechanical environment was morally plastic. The fact that nature submits to the organization which we call life is a fundamental and constant condition of all civilization. But there is nothing in the mere compliance of nature to press life forward. It is the menace of nature which stimulates progress. It is because nature always remains a source of difficulty and danger that life is provoked to renew the war and achieve a more thorough conquest. Nature will not permit life to keep what it has unless it gains more." (*The Moral Economy,* p. 130).

How true this remark is, becomes evident as soon as we analyze these finalities of socialistic theories, the conditions, the system. Good or bad, are they not all man-made? Is not every *milieu* charged with human effort, and subject to human influence? Could man then be so hopelessly subject to the work of his own efforts, good or bad?

Yet, in what fatalistic strain the *Boston American* of August 3, 1911, writes in an editorial on the appointment of four judges: "The four judges whom the Governor has appointed are four good men to-day. What they will be to-morrow, no man knows. They go into a different environment and will lead a different kind of business life. What effect these changes will have upon them only time can tell. Ratigan. Keating, and Dubuque are men of character and ability and good lawyers. Walter Perley Hall has been tried satisfactorily in public office."

It is, of course, conceivable that individuals may fail in adverse surroundings. Virtue is not always triumphant. But to speak of moral integrity as is done here, is certainly to despair of all goodness. Soon these same

men will call upon virtuous men to bring about or to maintain civic righteousness,—after having declared virtue fictitious. Thus it is that socialism confronts us with the stultifying fact that it makes its appeal in behalf of the individual whom it ignores, and fights for a civic righteousness, the reality of which it denies. Pleading for human love, the socialist fans class-hatred. He denounces greed, and contends for material gain as the only value of life.

Surely, with Montaigne, we must realize that "everyone must have an inner touchstone (*un patron au dedans*) by which to judge his actions." Man is a responsible being, and at least the law will hold him accountable. The ethical life assures us that conscience is a mighty fact, not to be discarded by theories. God has left His witness in the human heart. None can disobey His mandate with impunity. Each individual faces the issues of life singly and incurs personal responsibility. If life is our own in the last instance, we cannot live it by proxy, cannot resolve it into a mere component part of social existence, cannot make it the outcome of conditions. The pinch of individuality is with us, and with the *I* goes a conscience which is more than a social verdict. It is something which concerns me directly, to which I must make a personal response, and thus incur responsibility.

Maurice in his *Lectures on Casuistry* calls attention to the fact that, in behalf of ethical and religious improvement, appeals are made to public opinion to enforce the claims of the individual conscience on the one hand, and on the other to the individual conscience to bear up public opinion; showing thus that the point of leverage is with the individual, embodied in social ethics. All endeavors to make conscience a resulting inner response to external environment, whether in

social interpretation, or legal explanation, or evolutionary analysis, fail to account for its authoritative, apodictive commands. Conscience neither seeks its authority from the things of the world, nor endeavors to justify its laws by them. For one surely does not reason one's self into an obligation which requires sacrifice even unto death. To be sure, the actual ethical responses are considered to be primarily, or at least mainly, emotional; but this does not account for the strong sentiment of the objectiveness of obligation, and sanction of duty and ought. But more than this, the social self is always transcended by the ideal self.

As Professor Baldwin remarks: "The social influence which determines the development of conscience almost entirely in its earlier stages is itself transcended, in the rational or self-conscious organization of the moral life; so that the conscience becomes not merely a social self, but an ideal self."

Similarly Professor Ormond observes in his *Foundations of Knowledge:* "We are obliged to trace the primary root of the sense of kind to the self in some primary, individual nature, that in becoming internally conscious becomes also the fontal type of all ends which it seeks objectively." "The reaction of the subject-consciousness is a reaction as a whole, and self-apprehension will be a function of this mode of reaction. If we are sure of our self-activity, we have that assurance because we grasp it in an act of immediate intuition. It cannot be disputed, then, that we know the fact of our self-activity. . . . If in the reactive consciousness, self-activity, and not simply activity that has no label, is revealed, then it is clear that we have a qualification of the content as a whole which renders it not merely a *that,* but a *what.* The fact that the activity is taking the form of a self shows that it is not formless,

but defining itself as a whole."

To the like effect, Fouillée remarks in his *Psychologie des peuples européens:* "M. Guyau and M. Tarde have strongly insisted that we are under the dominion of continual suggestion, coming from the environment in which we live. . . . We disagree with those who reduce the whole of sociology to a study of these forms, and we believe that the study of its psychological foundation is essential to sociology."

This fact is also clearly brought out in an able essay, in the *American Journal of Sociology,* by Dr. Philip Fogel, who insists against Professor Giddings's denial, that there is plainly a metaphysical element involved in sociological studies. The worth of and the authority for the individual agent is assumed to be derived from and sustained by the community in the evolutionary theories, though it is admitted that natural selection has been overemphasized in its dual operation with the struggle for existence or adaptation to environment to bring about the survival of the fittest.

How are these functions related? How does the struggling individual find his place in this unfinished world, according to the plan which the whole is to body forth? Is it to be computed; or is the world's explanation to be apprehended only by faith? Spencer's evolutionary definition of conscience as being "the control of the less evolved feelings by the more evolved ones" projects from without those principles that we must find within. Moreover, the decision as to which is the more evolved feeling is to be made by this individual, who is left reacting rather than acting. We have on all sides primarily the subjective reference, for the moral and religious life announces itself as a private and individual experience.

It is plain, then, that in philosophical, ethical, and

religious questions, we are thrown back on the individual, as our starting-point. And the main objection against sociological theories such as imitation, consciousness of kind, social forms as suggestion, and different evolutionary theories, is that the initiative and interpretation are always from without. Conscience, as the basis of moral and religious life, may be ruled by law, but it is not produced by it. A law-abiding citizen may be of flavorless morality. This appeal to the personal consciousness always is assumed in the practice of life.

When Mr. Hughes was Governor of New York, he put this impressively: "I do not sympathize very much with schemes of moral regeneration through legislation. We can accomplish a great deal by wise laws, but the impetus of moral movements must be given as a rule by the voluntary work of citizens who, with the force of conviction, press their views upon the people and secure that public sentiment according to which alone any true moral reform can be accomplished. I also have very little sympathy with an ambitious scheme for doing away with all evil in the community at once."

The final sentence is so significant in its practical bearings that we make an observation regarding it with reference to American conditions. The actual morality of a community, affected in its usual way by influences within its social life and from without, does not materially change from day to day. Moral progress being as slow as it is desirable, within a given time the morality of a society and its citizens remains practically the same, and with this more or less constant quantity of moral flavor its corresponding conditions are maintained.

This fact is sadly overlooked by that zeal without knowledge which often starts crusades, campaigns, and

agitations calling upon the devices of law to do away with the evils of society which offend the moral sense. These impatient and cheap emotional reformers often have forced laws upon communities with the single result that they have been simply broken and evaded; or, if successfully executed, drives the evils into other channels, or spread them so as to escape observation. The real reformer reforms from within. Christ thus remakes a sin-stricken race. Moral education is harder than external moral discipline, but it touches the mainspring of human progress, and it therefore deserves the enthusiasm of reformers rather than the restraining agency of the law.

Water does not rise higher than its own level. Impulsive legalism is therefore wrong not only because the evils of society cannot be removed mechanically by strict laws against them; but especially because no society furnishes means for rigorously executing laws which are too high for its average member to attain. Thus the law itself becomes a farce, because it has to fall back upon personal application for efficiency. This is even more true in regard to the more serious ailment of society, prevailing greed and dishonesty, than it is concerning the much-talked-about forms of vice.

All schemes of reform are necessarily wrecked upon mercenary officials. These presuppose, of course, a prevailing practice of dishonesty, since an honest community as necessarily disposes of a mercenary official, as a dishonest community corrupts or displaces the honest one. What, then, avail laws for safety, purity of food, hygiene, education, and the like, if inspectors and supervisors are being bought? It requires the force of moral fiber in the community to enforce moral laws, not the temporary excitement of good-will from otherwise inadequate human nature. Immoral elements no

more can stand guard over moral laws than moral individuals can be expected to enforce immoral laws or practices.

Of course, in advocacy of restraint by law, its salutary, educating influence may be appealed to; but this argument, to be valid, presupposes precisely that the law be not too far in advance of the average morality of the community. The common assumption, however, in the clamor for laws as cure for social and individual evils, is that the positive moral elements of the community are too weak to withstand, to regulate, certainly to overcome, the evil in its midst. Thus the positive, regenerating cure is abandoned, and resort is made to restraint, which may beat back evil, but never overcome it. Yet, this negative, outward restraint relies for its efficiency upon an adequate amount of moral health in the community, which nevertheless the argument starts out by ignoring. In fine, a community whose moral health cannot deal primarily in some positive way with its evils, instead of having to lean exclusively on the restraint of law, is doomed. It is Voltaire and Frederick the Great again at Sans Souci, strangers to the cause of Christendom, and disbelieving its redeeming power, yet appalled by vice and wickedness whose powers they overrated with the exclamation, *"Ecrasez l'infâme!"* It is the word of the Frenchman in the grip of sensuality: "Where is the woman! kill her." It is the impatient, faithless temper of hysterical revolt against threatening evils whose encroaching powers seem to loom larger than Christ's assuring words would intimate: "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof."

Unbelief regarding the strength of the existing influences for good is evident in the argument for a bridled press made by Sayons in *"Le XVIII siècle a l'étranger"*: "That error does no harm except to him

who writes, and that truth needs no defense except by itself, is strictly true in the abstract realm of pure reason. The question after all is to know whether minds capable of being influenced by error can be brought back by the truth they do not perceive. Now, when error is incompatible with the existence of civil society, civil society perhaps does well not to count on the rays of light from the truth to enlighten the blind." Thus in placing emphasis upon the positive element as the real principle in progressive moral development, we but repeat the view which held of the Mosaic legislation that "the Law must be realized in an inner harmony between the heart of the worshipper and Jehovah; it must be accepted, not as a curb or rein, but as the rule of the inner life. Only thus can the heart and the life correspond, and the outward observance be the true index of the inward moral reality. The Law graven on tables of stone is to be written by the spirit on the fleshly tables of the heart."

Woodrow Wilson, in one of his addresses also has emphatically declared that the people ought to be cured of the appetite for laws as the remedy for all ills. Before the American Bar Association at Chattanooga, Tennessee, he said: "The major premise of all Law is moral responsibility, the moral responsibility of individuals for their acts, and no other foundation can any man lay on which a stable fabric of equitable justice may be reared."

The Americans have a peculiar weakness for legislation as a panacea for all social ills. It seems a curious anomaly that in many cases the liquor interests helped to vote "dry" a town or a state, in order to increase their "bottle trade." Prohibition plainly does not prohibit when the prohibition element is not morally and numerically prevailing in the community which adopts

such a measure. Hence this device of legislative reform as a cure for moral weakness in the community life stands condemned in all its bareness and inadequacy. Yet, whenever an abuse crops up flagrantly enough to attract public notice the cry is heard to legislate it out of sight. This is certainly a strange device in the land of the "American Spirit," where the citizen has

> "The cynic devil in his blood
> That bids him mock his hurrying soul;
> That bids him flout the Law he makes,
> That bids him make the Law he flouts."

The appeal is ever to the law to remove the objects of temptation or abuse out of the way. Thus the Americans who think they stand take heed lest they fall. The Dutchman, when under strain of besetting sin, will summon his moral force to fight against it, but the American wants the object of his temptation removed by passing a law against it. It is far the easiest way. And it never occurs to him how incongruous a procedure this is in "the land of the free and the home of the brave."

The attempts at social betterment address themselves to the individuals as private persons. Those who seek the betterment of society in education, and in improved conditions, tacitly assume that the individual will be first to respond to the aim of ethical and religious effort. On this score, the principle of social settlements is radically false, though it may work some good through its very inconsistency. One cannot apply to the slum population a law of life taken from artificially transplanted characters who remain, as moral leaders, still dependent for success on the disposition of those

whom they try to improve. The effort to make the display of moral excellence an inducement to improvement on the part of the socially unfortunate is based upon faulty psychological principles. The initiative in moral and religious life must spring from within; in the response of the will we find our obligated responsibility. Both the tempting and the tempted are factors to be dealt with. But no temptation obtains where individual inclination does not respond to evil surroundings, nor is there aspiration after virtue if the good is not perceived as such. Thus Mill's argument that it is never a duty to force civilization upon another nation, not willing to receive it, is rendered superfluous. From the nature of the case, this is an impossibility with individuals and nations alike.

Human consciousness is exercising a constant selective activity. It selects certain elements of its environment to which almost undivided attention is given, whilst it ignores other elements persistently. These constantly ignored elements of our environment practically drop out of our life; they have, as far as we are concerned, no real existence and for all practical purposes might as well not be. The determination of our individual characteristics is continually confirmed by this circumstance and the self, instead of being subjected to its environment, rather realizes itself by this preferential use it makes of its environment according to its own nature. This is summed up in the popular saying that each one gets what he is looking for; for God's decree is that each shall get his own.

Hindu wisdom proclaims: Beware of your wishes for they will surely be fulfilled. Prolonged habit becomes the character into which a person's nature stands revealed. Plutarch said well: "*τό ἦθος ἔθος πολυ Χρόνιον.*" Selective thinking does in no way, however, reduce

thinking to an instrumental use in behalf of ideal ends, as pragmatists assert, but it turns in view the homely wisdom of the old saying that the wish is often father of the thought, even when facts seem patently to contradict the hopes furthered by our desires. As Demosthenes had it, "ὁ βουλεται τοοθ' ἕκαστος καὶ ὀιεται." What each one wishes that he also thinks. This fact disposes of the modernist notion of distinterested thinking, it sets aside the superficial view which treats thinking as if it were detached in its operation, or that thought ever should function mechanically. It sets against the vaunted theories of *Voraussetzungslosigkeit* the biblical statement: "as a man thinketh in his heart so is he" and remembers that "out of it are the issues of life." The rationalist position which conceives of a bare, abstract truth and in pretended impartiality formulates its cold, modern theories is here contrasted with the living "truth as it is in Jesus." We are led to consider Truth as a living, vital principle, and Christianity not only as a system of teaching, but rather as a new principle of life, which wherever its influence is at work assimilates the elements of its environment, and transforms them into forms of Christian life. Truth is more than actuality, it always transcends reality. Philology does not disclose, therefore, its full meaning, for truth (M. E. treowth = D. trouw = fidelity) is something deeper than fidelity to reality. ἐν τῃ Ἀρχῃ ὁ Λογος.

The meaning of reality is happily rendered by the Dutch word *werkelijkheid* which prevents the pragmatic use of the term truth (*waarheid*) by identifying it with reality (*werkelijkheid*). The Dutch know that *koude werkelijkheid* is not the same as *levende waarheid*. Living truth cannot be identified with cold reality.

It is, therefore, a much profounder problem to educate (*educere* = to bring out) man truly than superficial liberal theories would lead us to believe. Truth is not neutral. Neither any teacher, nor any pupil can ever be neutral. Yet liberalism proclaimed the monstrous fiction of a neutral school and a neutral education.

We can not take the truth and dole it out, as priggish modern enlightenment would dispense it at its own discretion. Rather we are of, and hence in the truth, where the spirit of truth leads us into all truth. We, teachers and pupils alike, are servants called into the cosmic movement, in which we neither control the plan, nor even fully analyze our faith. Pascal might well exclaim: *"Le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connait pas!"* for as Paul teaches, "With the heart man believeth unto righteousness." Experience alone brings often the true interpretation of facts. There is no reality in religion without a living experience of our own.

"Though Christ a thousand times in Bethlehem be born,
But not within thyself, thy soul shall be forlorn;
The cross of Golgotha thou lookest to in vain
Unless within thyself it be set up again."

We cannot then receive or inherit the realization of any truth whatever, unless we first are prepared to receive it. Goethe's words bear repeating: *"Was du erebt von deinen Vätern hast, Erwirb' es, um es zu besitzen."*

Walt Whitman's lines are worth remembering, "No one can acquire for another—not one. No one can grow for another—not one. The song is to the singer, and comes back most to him. And no man understands

any greatness or goodness but his own, or the indication of his own."

All truth as it operates takes on necessarily an individual and personal aspect. Truth is never impartial, for it always judges, condemning or confirming him to whom it addresses itself. So he who judges is himself judged by the selfsame judgment. "Judge not that ye be not judged!" Cast in the alembic of personality, truth always vibrates with moral considerations. Even infidel France asserted: *"La science sans conscience est la mort de lâme."* As the receptive mind then is not merely a passive sensitive plate, the imparting agent never an indifferently operating factor, and least of all the subject matter of truth a dead issue, it becomes plain that Christian Science and Christian instruction should be urged in all educational matters.

The good precept is not readily taken, or the good example imitated, when the heart is not prepared to receive it. Thus Hosea says: "Ephraim is joined to idols, let him alone." (Hosea 4:17). *Quem Deus vult perdere prius dementat.* Does not scripture say that their foolish heart was darkened? (Romans 1.21) and "Speaking lies in hypocrisy, having their conscience seared with a hot iron." (1 Timothy 4:2).

Shakespeare repeats the biblical truth:

"When we in our wickedness grow hard,
(O misery on't!) the wise gods seal our eyes;
In our own filth drop our clear judgments, make us
Adore our errors; laugh at us, while we strut
To our confusion." (Antony and Cleopatra).

The fact that the home of truth is within man is confirmed also by the striking object lesson that you can not escape "the world, the flesh and the devil" by

the time-honored but fruitless attempt to hide away in the seclusion of cell, retreat, or monastary, for the simple reason that you can not thus shut out temptation.

> "Hidden away in ascetic cell,
> The tempter appears with vision strong,
> And in the most secluded spot
> Finds us the siren's song."

Surely "Every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed." (*James* 1:14). Hence, Jonathan Edwards described virtue well as the love of right motives considered as mortally beautiful, or as admiration for goodness as beauty of a spiritual sort.

This aspect of appropriating the good through our inner desires makes it plain that those are most Christ-like characters who like Christ most. "This aspect of Christianity may properly be elevated into a larger significance. We may view Christianity from its inward, positive, dynamic side,—Christ at work on the hearts of the believers,—as contrasted with its formal, external, its social and historic course. The issue of an inward religion is the burden of the prophets, and always centers on the personal accountability to a personal God. Every inward revelation bears the stamp of an authority over the world which it entreats to gracious submission to the Creator's will. In the conflict of moral struggles it asserts: 'Be not afraid of their faces, for I am with thee to deliver thee, saith the Lord.' (Jer I, 8). 'We must obey God rather than men.' (Acts V, 20). The distinguishing characteristic of Christianity is that preceptive, legal, restraining codes are turned into dynamic, positive life-principles.

Christ buttresses Christianity. As Paul reiterates with persuasive testimony; Christ lives in the Christian and thus makes the church 'a collective Christ.'" (The author's *Belief in a Personal God*).

Indeed it always has been the Christian principle and effort to regenerate and improve society through the individual. Thus the leverage of, the principle for, and the approach to moral improvement is within. The spiritual eye of faith discloses the treasure and importance of the individual soul, that it would not profit a man if he should gain the whole world and lose his own soul. One may gauge the spiritual tenor of Christian churches and views largely by their realization of this fact. The more environment, external circumstances, social conditions, engross the attention, the less real Christian nurture of the soul, the formation of character after, yea, in, Christ is lost sight of. The popular verdict that desertion of the church's true function to preach the gospel and minister to Christian nurture, leads to socialism is only too true. Utilitarian efforts always attack preferably the material surroundings, where effects show more readily than in the spiritual realm. Their mechanical notions find encouragement in the world of visible things in tangible results, while patient devotion to spiritual interests often severely strains the faith of the average believer. The unprecedented industrial development and material prosperity of recent years naturally fosters this attitude of mind.

In 1829 Edward Irving wrote: "Men are grown mechanical in head and heart, as well as in hand. They have lost faith in individual endeavor, and in natural force, of any kind. Not for internal perfection, but for external combinations and arrangements, for institutions, constitutions—for Mechanism of one sort or

other, do they hope and struggle. Their whole efforts, attachments, opinions, turn on mechanism, and are of a mechanical character. This condition of the two great departments of knowledge; the outward, cultivated exclusively on mechanical principles—the inward finally abandoned, because, cultivated on such principles, it is found to yield no result—sufficiently indicates the intellectual bias of our time, its all-pervading disposition towards that line of enquiry. In fact, an inward persuasion long has been diffusing itself, and now and then even comes to utterance, that except the eternal, there are no true sciences; that to the inward world (if there be any) our only conceivable road is through the outward; that, in short, what cannot be investigated and understood mechanically, cannot be investigated and understood at all. [The Scotch divine anticipated here Dubois Reymond's watchword, *"Was nicht mechanisch gefasst ist, ist nicht wissenschaftlich verstanden!"*]

"Nowhere is the deep, almost exclusive faith, we have in mechanism, more visible than in the Politics of this time. Civil government does, by its nature, include much that is mechanical, and must be treated accordingly. We term it, indeed, in ordinary language, the Machine of Society and talk of it as the grand working wheel from which all private machines must derive, or to which they must adapt, their movements. Considered merely as a metaphor, all this is well enough; but here, as in so many other cases, the 'foam hardens itself into a shell,' and the shadow we have wantonly evoked stands terrible before us, and will not depart at our bidding. Government includes much also that is not mechanical, and cannot be treated mechanically; of which latter truth, as appears to us, the political speculations and exertions of our time are tak-

ing less and less cognizance. It is no longer the moral, religious, spiritual condition of the people that is our concern, but their physical, practical, economical condition, as regulated by public laws. Thus is the Body-politic more than ever worshipped and tended: but the Soul-politic less then ever. Were the laws, the government, in good order, all were well with us; the rest would care for itself. Dissentients from this opinion, expressed or implied, are now rarely to be met with; widely and angrily as men differ in its application, the principle is admitted by all. Contrive the fabric of law aright, and without further effort on your part, that divine spirit of freedom which all hearts venerate and long for, will of herself come to inhabit it; and under her healing wings every noxious influence will wither, every good and salutary one more and more expand. The domain of Mechanism, meaning thereby political, ecclesiastical, or other outward establishments,—once was considered as embracing, and we are persuaded can at any time embrace, but a limited portion of man's interests, and by no means the highest portion."

"These dark features," Irving goes on to say, "we are aware, belong more or less to other ages, as well as to ours. This faith in Mechanism, in the all-importance of physical things, is in every age the common refuge of Weakness and blind Discontent. To reform a world, to reform a nation, no wise man will undertake; and all but foolish men know that the only solid, though a far slower reformation, is what each begins and perfects on himself."

Those Liberals, who still recognize Christian tradition, are beginning to perceive the harmful influence of the reformation from without theory,—when at least their socialist *confrères* act upon it in consistent manner. Thus *The Congregationalist* remarks in re-

gard to socialist propaganda among the immigrants: "His conscience might in many exigencies take the place of his religious beliefs, but the socialist agitator relieves the individual of all responsibility for wrong-doing, laying the blame on society. The thief, the swindler, the counterfeiter, the cadet, the prostitute, are all victims of the corrupt system."

Professor Wenley, in the *Educational Review* for October, 1907, in an article *Can we Stem the Tide?* remarks: "Careful, and even thoughtful, about processes, the democracy omits to understand that the thing to be gained by the process constitutes the essence of the affair. So it stresses every conceivable aid to life, and lets life itself slip. In the effort to govern everything else, the modern man has failed to provide arrangements whereby he may govern himself. If one thing be plainer than another about our trumpeted recent achievement, it is this—they verge on the hopeless bankruptcy in wellnigh everything relating to the elevation of the human spirit."

Professor Munsterberg observes in his *American Problems:* "The whole radicalism of the prohibition movement would not be necessary if there were more training for self-control. To prohibit always means only the removal of the temptation, but what is evidently more important is to remain temperate in the midst of a world of temptation. The rapid growth of divorce, the silly chase for luxury, the rivalry in ostentation and in the gratification of personal desires in a hundred forms cannot be cured if only one or another temptation is taken out of sight. The improvement must come from within. The fault is in ourselves, in our prejudices, in our training, in our habits, in our fanciful fear of nervousness."

"Better methods," says Professor Peabody, "may

simplify the social question, it can be solved by nothing less than better men."

The stage has its part in the evil we have been processing.

There is instilled in the minds of thousands, by cheap melodramas, the unnerving conviction that man is merely, and nothing but, the creature of circumstances. With the exception of the customary villain, who is an impersonation of evil, the characters of modern plays are borne inevitably onward to their fall,—though sometimes with a display of a half-hearted battle against their evil stars. Could not this very seamy side of life, with its baseness, its vice, misfortune, abandonment, and misery, be presented as the scene where determination for the right resists the onslaught of evil in the struggles of life? Is it not as human to battle for the right as to drift along with the evil currents? Must man's belief in himself be undermined by those who have most trumpeted his greatness?

If it is human to be tempted, it is also human to withstand temptation. In much of the modern presentation of life, we really have only pleas to bear with moral weakness and sin, the assumption being that the real presence of temptation explains and thereby excuses any moral collapse. It is the slippery French morality of *"Tout comprendrè c'est tout pardonner."* Moreover these modern studies of life are mostly portrayals of moral and social disease. But we are told everywhere that one does not know life if its seamy side remains unknown. Hence, there is an interest in, and often a predilection for the diseased, the abnormal and unwholesome side of life. According to Zola's definition of literary art as "a corner of nature seen through a temperament," many vicious temperaments are engaged in showing in their novels the obscene corners, just as

low-lived creatures make people see the sights in the large cities.

When the evil and weak spots thus are given undue attention and accordingly magnified, faith in the wholesome, dutiful course of life is undermined. Besides the battle is mostly lost before the soldier leaves his tent, because of a disbelief in moral victory in such surroundings, in such corners seen through such temperaments. Lead us therefore not into temptation with the French motto: *"L'art c'est un coin de la nature vue à travers d'un tempérament."*

Dr. Siegmar Schultze, in his dark picture of modern literature, in *Der Zeitgeist der modernen Litteratur Europas,* makes the significant remark: "In philosophy, and in the worldly wisdom of the educated, the sad materialism to be sure is diminishing; but on the other hand it is increasing among the half-educated and the people. Our contemporaries see truth only in the actual, and thus are earthly-minded. They see the victory of the principle of goodness only in external results, not in the inner good which comes to the real man in the struggle of life."

Thus, as we inquire into the moral progress of man or of society, we inevitably are led to the individual as a starting-point. And there, in the heart of man, we cannot fail to recognize as its goal the source of all moral goodness and truth. To recognize God in Christ in all things about us, especially in our fellow-creatures, and so to speak, to live, Christ into this world of institutions and men, linking it from the past to a better future, is a Christian's faith. He proclaims this recognition of God's authority over himself and the world to be an individual act, but he knows that, as a man responds to his choices, so is he responsible, and that refusal of God's claims spells ruin to individual

and society alike. As Professor Bowen declares in his *Lowell Lectures on Metaphysics and Ethical Science:* "The civilization which is not based upon Christianity is big with the elements of its own destruction." The gospel, therefore, in loving appeal to man, ever urges, his soul-concern as his sole concern.

> "Know'st thou Yesterday, its aim and reason?
> Work'st thou well Today, for worthy things?
> Then calmly wait the Morrow's hidden season,
> And fear not thou, what hap' so 'er it brings!"

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